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The drug war in Latin America has received an increasing amount of funds and resources 
since it began nearly four decades ago. Recent efforts by the United States and Mexico to 
combat illegal narcotics traffickers have gained increased attention in the wake of 
September 2001 terrorist attacks. Similar efforts by the United States have been tried in 
the past, particularly in Colombia, with varied levels of success. This increased level of 
attention runs in counterpoint to the continued vitality of the drug trade, as markets 
expand and consumption remains steady. Violence resulting from drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs) in Mexico has produced an even greater sense of urgency for both 
nations to respond to this threat. The latest plan to combat DTOs and the drug trade, the 
Mérida Initiative, has gained high visibility and shows promise at providing an adequate 
solution. 
This thesis will discuss the effectiveness of the Mérida Initiative and its ability to 
impact the trafficking of illegal narcotics in the United States and Latin America. 
Likewise, we will use the Mérida Initiative as an example of modern supply-side 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Latin America’s war on drugs is steadily growing, especially over the past four 
decades, requiring increased U.S. military involvement and vast expenditures. Mexico, in 
particular, has been a recipient of increased U.S. military aid. From 2008 to 2010, the 
U.S. allocated $1.3 billion for military funding, humanitarian aid, and civic assistance 
through a counternarcotics program known as the Mérida Initiative (MI).1  The U.S. 
continues to contribute to the MI by providing funds and resources for the purchase of 
modernized helicopters and scanning technology for border crossings ($310 million in 
2011 and $290 million requested for 2012).2  Focused spending on the MI, between 
2007–2008 and 2009–2010, shows increased resolve to combat the drug trafficking 
problem, as the total funds allocated nears $2 billion.3 Yet, in spite of increased bilateral 
efforts to deter drug traffickers through U.S. military aid, global levels of drug 
consumption remain high.4 According to the United Nations World Drug Report, global 
consumption of illicit substances grew from as many as 250 million users in 2007, to as 
many as 300 million users in 2010. These numbers indicate that as much as six percent of 
the population aged 15–64 used illegal drugs during those years.5  This, in turn, raises the 
question that this thesis addresses: Has the MI been an effective tool to increase drug 
prices and reduce narcotic consumption? 
                                                 
1 “Merida Initiative the United States has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better 
Performance Measures: Report to Congressional Requesters.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 11. 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation the Mérida 
Initiative and Beyond, by Clare R. Seelke and, Kristin M. Finkle, CRS Report R41349 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, January, 14, 2013). 
3 Clare R. Seelke, C. R. Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues 
(Washington, DC: DIANE Publishing, 2010). 
4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Reports 2012. Annual World Drug Report (New York: 
United Nations Publication Sales, 2012), 7. 
5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Reports 2009. Annual World Drug Report (New York: 
United Nations Publication Sales, 2009), 12; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Reports 2012. 
Annual World Drug Report (New York: United Nations Publication Sales, 2012), 7. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
A study of the MI and its effectiveness deserves our attention for a number of 
reasons. First, the initiative was specifically designed to deal with the supply side of drug 
trafficking. As outlined by Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, supply-side (SS) 
approaches operate under the presumption that “reducing supply will make the illicit drug 
trade more dangerous and costly. This in turn is assumed to drive down production, drive 
up prices, and ultimately discourage… citizens from buying and using illicit drugs.”6  If 
advocates of SS policies are correct, the implementation of the MI should have had 
considerable effects on drug prices and narcotics consumption. This would thus serve as 
an indicator of effectiveness; we would then witness increased retail prices for illegal 
narcotics, as well as a decreased drug use globally, particularly in the United States.    
Second, anti-drug plans, as the one proposed in Mexico, have been suggested for 
other countries as well, including those of Central America, the Caribbean, and the 
Andean states of South America.7  Hence, an understanding of how the MI has operated 
in the past five years should provide a number of lessons learned about how SS policies 
affect (or not, as the case may be) drug prices and narcotics consumption. Additionally, 
in considering the MI’s successes, we can see which methods have been most effective 
and why, allowing us to identify conditions for success or failure.   
Finally, if measures such as the MI are ineffective at lowering consumption, then 
governments and policy makers should perhaps focus their attention on alternative 
policies. In fact, in recent years, the United Nations and key Latin American politicians 
have suggested the need to focus on decriminalizing consumption as an alternative policy 
to tackle drug consumption. A report by the Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP), 
which includes three former Latin American presidents (Fernando Enrique Cardoso, 
César Gaviria, and Ernesto Zedillo), considers that “the global war on drugs has failed, 
                                                 
6 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The U.S. “War on Drugs”: Its Impact in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005). 
7 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy. 
Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0419/2004014978.html. 
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with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world.”8  It 
outlines the need for a more comprehensive approach to drug trafficking and 
consumption, including greater attention to human (or demand-side) factors, such as 
decriminalization of non-violent usage, possible legal regulation of illicit drugs, and 
increased health and treatment opportunities for users.9  In other words, if the findings of 
this study conclude that the MI has been ineffective, policy changes might be necessary 
in the future, including a complete overhaul of U.S. anti-drug policies.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis presents a qualitative analytical comparison of anti-drug measures 
over time by analyzing key elements of the MI and their effectiveness in the war on 
drugs. From the literature concerning this topic, three apparent competing hypotheses are 
assessed in this thesis. The first hypothesis (H1) posits that if MI actions have been 
effective, results will show that its methods have increased the price of illegal drugs. The 
second hypothesis (H2), complementary to H1, follows that if the first hypothesis is true, 
data will show that increased prices of illegal drugs will decrease drug usage, both 
globally and in the United States. As stated by Renee Scherlen in “The Never-Ending 
Drug War,” SS strategies employ a “law enforcement approach to deter or punish users, 
sellers, and producers of illicit drugs. The policy emphasizes incarceration, eradication, 
interdiction, extradition, and supply reduction.  [It] focuses on supply; the [U.S.] 
government argues that market disruption and supply reduction will increase drug prices 
and decrease drug purity. The two elements combined should result in lower drug use 
among current users and a decrease in the number of new users.”10  As such, the first two 
hypotheses, if proven true, should demonstrate decreased usage and increased prices.   
Alternatively, hypothesis three (H3) provides a counter-perspective to the former 
hypotheses, positing that if MI actions have been ineffective, this study will see either 
                                                 
8 War on Drugs Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Global Commission on 
Drugs, 2011), 2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Renee Scherlen, “The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination.” PS: Political 
Science & Politics 45, no. 01 (2012): 67.http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1017/S1049096511001739, 1. 
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stable or reduced drug prices, as well as stable or increased illegal drug use and purity. 
This follows the form of the SS edict highlighted above, that greater supply reduction,  
interdiction, and penalties for drug use will decrease their prevalence among users, by 
applying the alternate outcome, in which the dependent variables (use and price) are 
negatively affected. 
Problems concerning this topic are centered on the ability to accurately obtain 
detailed information regarding the usage and retail selling of illicit narcotics. As outlined 
in the 2012 World Drug Report, the availability of information is scarce, considering the 
clandestine nature of drug trafficking; however, data challenges can be mitigated by 
considering multiple reporting sources, from both supporting and critical contributors to 
this debate.11  In researching this issue, I anticipated some conflict between supportive 
and opposing information regarding SS focused anti-drug measures. I also counted on the 
counterpoint provided by each side, in order to better examine the overall situation and 
provide greater legitimacy to analyzing each hypothesis.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of literature produced concerning the topic of anti-drug efforts and 
policies can be loosely categorized into two groups. The first group contains scientists 
and writers—from within and external to the U.S. government—who view the war on 
drugs as a major failure that should be readdressed or even abandoned. Scholars taking 
this approach tend to focus on the inability of policies to counteract the rising use of 
drugs, their continued prevalence in consumption markets, and decreased prices over 
time. This group seeks to empower alternatives to SS methods to more effectively target 
the larger problems posed by drug use, including crime, public insecurity, and health 
issues. The second group is largely comprised by proponents who are directly affiliated 
with the U.S. government or its allies. This group justifies increased resources and 
funding for current policies, citing figures such as the annual number of drug crops 
eradicated and shipments seized. This group sees the statistics provided by eradication, 
fumigation, and interdiction as evidence of successful policies that should be continued. 
                                                 
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012 (New York: United Nations, 2012), 13. 
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Historically, multiple programs were attempted in Latin America to combat the 
threat posed by the trafficking of illegal narcotics. In particular, these programs relied on 
SS approaches. As noted by Coletta Youngers, this refers to the “presumption that 
reducing supply will make the illicit drug trade more dangerous and costly. This in turn is 
assumed to drive down production, drive up prices, and ultimately discourage U.S. 
citizens from buying and using illicit drugs.”12  Such programs have been attempted in 
Bolivia, Colombia, the Caribbean, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, with various 
consequences, many of them unintended. 
These programs were originally spurred by increased U.S. influence. Beginning 
with the administration of President Richard Nixon, the U.S. sought to combat the 
perceived threat posed by illegal drug consumption and labeled drug use as a national 
security problem.13  The first major international cooperative effort to fight drugs was 
launched under President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981), working with Colombian President 
Julio Cesar Turbay (1978–1982) to frame the drug war within a law enforcement 
structure.14  In Colombia, the strategy focused on aerial fumigation and manual 
eradication of illicit narcotics crops to target the source of drugs, embodying the ideals of 
a SS approach. Additionally, this policy placed emphasis on directing police forces 
against the threat posed by traffickers. This precedent has been further expanded upon 
and largely abandoned throughout Latin America, as increased militarization of police 
forces has been seen as necessary in the face of adaptive transnational organized crime 
(TOC). This relationship was the first in a succession of policies between the United 
States and Latin American countries that introduced manual eradication, aerial 
fumigation, and illegal narcotics interdiction. This foundation was built during the 
administration of President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) in the form of the Andean 
                                                 
12 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The U.S. “War on Drugs”: Its Impact in Latin America and the 
Caribbean,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005), 
3. 
13 Eva Bertram, Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 3–
8. update all book footnotes 
14 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The U.S. “War on Drugs”: Its Impact in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, 1–13 (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 
2005, 103. 
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Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which focused on cocaine (the principally trafficked drug 
of the era) “source countries” of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.15  The Clinton 
administration (1993–2000) gave further support to the ACI, specifically working with 
President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) to create Plan Colombia, which was designed to 
target the increased coca cultivation in Colombia. There, production shifted from initial 
primary producers in Bolivia and Peru, because of eradication campaigns and increased 
interdiction.16  This “balloon effect,” wherein pressure applied to coca production areas in 
Bolivia and Peru forced cultivation into neighboring Colombia, resulted in a shift of coca 
production, which allowed Colombian cartels to increase their cocaine trade 
exponentially, including expanding trade routes into Mexico.17  Plan Colombia 
specifically, and U.S. counterdrug policies in general, were eventually expanded by 
Pastrana’s successor, Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002–2010) and U.S. president George W. 
Bush (2001–2008). Each administration faced grave threats to national security, as posed 
by insurgents (FARC in Colombia) and terrorists (Al Qaeda in the United States). The 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States caused a reshaping of national security 
perspective that included TOCs in the category of terrorism.18  As such, both nations 
began focusing on applying military means to drug trafficking problems. To Colombia, 
this meant great access to U.S. resources for counterinsurgency and anti-drug efforts; to 
the United States, this meant a greater need to extinguish narcotics trafficking as a means 
to eroding international terrorist organizations.19 In the following years, the elimination 
of drug cartels in these “source countries” opened a vacuum into which Mexican cartels 
have sprung, fomenting their power bases abroad, as well as at home, and creating yet 
another partner in the U.S. War on Drugs: Mexico.   
                                                 
15 Congressional Budget Office. Andean Initiative: Objectives and Support. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 1994, 13. 
16 Beatriz Acevedo, Dave Bewley-Taylor, Coletta Youngers, Ten Years of Plan Colombia: an Analytic 
Assessment, Briefing Paper no. sixteen, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme, September 2008, 2. 
17 Ibid., 3. 
18 White House Administrative Office, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” U.S. 
Government Printing Office, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
19 Report, International Crisis Group, Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, November 13, 
2003. 
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The MI was an international program launched by the United States to work with 
Mexico’s government and police forces; it was intended to address the rising tide of 
perceived threat from organized crime in the realm of illegal drug trafficking. The 
program was signed by former President George W. Bush and Mexican President Felipe 
Calderon (2006–2012) in the fall of 2007, but did not place actual forces on the ground in 
Mexico until 2008. In particular, the aftermath of terrorist attacks in September 2011 
prompted the U.S. government to view the relationship with its southern neighbor in a 
new light, considering potential connections between terrorist organizations seeking to 
harm the United States and the capital involved in organized crime, with particular 
respect to the illegal narcotics trade. While the MI includes efforts to aid Central 
American nations, including the Dominican Republic and Haiti, it focuses primarily on 
Mexico. The MI was spearheaded by the U.S. Department of State (DoS), but following 
actions in U.S. government caused spin-off programs by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security as well as the Department of Justice.20  Similar programs, aimed at 
securing the southwestern U.S. border against trafficking organizations, have largely 
been supplemental efforts coordinated under the guise of and alongside the MI, 
effectively using avenues initially paved in the 1970s to allow the MI to advance U.S. 
anti-narcotics efforts in the present.  
When taken as a whole, this group of counterdrug policies and initiatives has 
many shared assumptions and traits, centered on continual U.S. influence. First, these 
plans share a logic that equates drug trafficking to be a national security threat. Every 
U.S. administration, from presidents Nixon to Obama, promoted the idea that illegal drug 
consumption was an element that eroded the fabric of the nation, economically, morally, 
or otherwise, including the reduction of public welfare (via usage affecting social norms 
in the Nixon era, or providing terrorist support in the new millennium). U.S. officials 
have been able to pair this perspective alongside similar viewpoints, as evidenced in 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico. Secondly, these policies make the assumption that this 
threat can be nullified by focusing on SS approaches. This preponderance of resources 
                                                 
20 United States Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures: Report to Congressional Requesters 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2010). 
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and policies has focused on the targeted reduction of drug supply elements and higher 
penalties for usage, in order to provide for a lessened instance of availability, and thereby 
lower consumption overall. Lastly, by largely adopting the SS approach outright, this 
shared logic leaves little, if any, room for the consideration of alternative policies. This 
results in an end state akin to the proverbial ‘all the eggs in one basket,’ wherein applying 
only one course of action does not guarantee success. When taken in total, and considered 
historically, it is possible to see that these policies have largely been reiterations of their 
predecessors, with evolutionary changes that increased not only the scope of the War on 
Drugs, but the depth of funding and type of resources allocated for its continued 
execution. In essence, regardless of the country partnered with the United States at the 
time, these policies present a framework that emphasizes the supply side of the drug trade 
and enhances the associated military-based means to combat it, leaving little possibility 
for alternate considerations. 
Critics of this approach cite recurring, shared inconsistencies among the major SS 
policies, presenting arguments that highlight pitfalls and question such policies, all while 
offering alternative courses of action. Critics’ comments are mainly focused around five 
major points: (1) SS policies contain ineffective measures of performance, (2) current 
measures of effectiveness are unrealistic, (3) SS policies do not account for the negative, 
unintended consequences of drug trafficking, (4) SS policies do not meet their stated 
objectives, and (5) no consideration is given to alternative policies. 
First, authors state that current anti-drug policies lack proper mechanisms for 
evaluation and feedback regarding their effectiveness, which is a crucial item in assessing 
true progress. Specifically, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports 
that current measures of performance for U.S.-based anti-drug policies in Latin America 
lack the ability to effectively assess ongoing efforts. It states that the policies’ “strategic 
documents lack certain key elements that would facilitate accountability and 
management. For example, its strategic documents do not include outcome performance 
measures that indicate progress toward achieving strategic goals. In addition, [the U.S. 
Department of] State has not developed a comprehensive set of timelines for all expected 
deliveries, though it plans to provide additional equipment and training in both Mexico 
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and Central America.”21  In other words, the governing documents for these policies do 
not include measurable progress markers, nor do they indicate a framework in which 
these measures should be timely achieved, instead simply give vague wording to the 
sentiment that future international support will be afforded. Additionally, as evidenced by 
Rachel Nelid, Renee Scherlen, Coletta Youngers, and Eileen Rosen, SS programs have an 
innate tendency for little oversight or measures for accountability.22  This lack of capacity 
for administration within the programs causes gross consequences, including human 
rights violations and provides no meter by which U.S. Congress can ascertain the 
effectiveness of these programs. 
Second, SS delves into the premise that current measures of effectiveness are 
unrealistic. Reports show that the reporting agencies in the War on Drugs rely heavily on 
the statistics concerning the amount of land annually eradicated and the number and size 
of seizures. Critics argue that the reliance on such measures to proclaim achievement of 
policy objectives shows a very narrowly constrained vision of true effectiveness in anti-
drug policy.23  Specifically, the early trend of U.S. government agencies to report 
eradicated hectares (ha) of land associated with drug crop production showed inaccurate 
reporting of actual crops affected by such tactics.24  Even when considering sources that 
should be removed from U.S. government influence, such as the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), we can see that its best efforts to report on successfully 
eradicated crops still contain elements of questionable bias, since a majority of the World 
Drug Report figures are taken from U.S. agencies or their affiliates in partner nations.25  
                                                 
21 United States Government Accountability Office, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures: Report to Congressional Requesters 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2010), 2. 
22 Rachel Nelid. “U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: 
The Impact of U.S. Policy, edited by Youngers, Coletta and Eileen Rosin, 61–98. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005; 
Renee Scherlen. “The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy Termination.” PS: Political Science & 
Politics 45, no. 01 (2012): 67. doi:10.1017/S1049096511001739.;  Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin. “The U.S. “War 
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As discussed by Ramirez, Stanton and Walsh, the success of a heavy fumigation strategy 
in Colombia was “dubious” at best.26  In their work, they postulate that reports of U.S.-
Colombian success in eradication efforts in 2002–2003 failed to consider the “balloon 
effect” (mentioned above) and did little to nullify production efforts, as Colombia 
remained the “largest coca-growing country in the world.”27 
The third point speaks to the unintended consequences of SS policies, citing these 
results as creating more harm than good, specifically to the environment, human rights, 
and the inhabitant farmers themselves. John Walsh, as Senior Associate for the Andes 
and Drug Policy at the Washington Office on Latin America, provided testimony to the 
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in 2008, shedding light onto some of 
these pitfalls.28  In his statement, Walsh highlights the fact that current SS policies fail to 
account for the resilient nature of crop production and the lack of feasible alternatives. He 
says that forced eradication only combats the immediate problem of a current drug crop, 
leaving farmers with no suitable alternative to plant instead. He refers to a UNODC 
report which recommends “ensuring that eradication is not undertaken until small farmer 
households have viable and sustainable livelihoods and interventions are properly 
sequenced.”29  In essence, forced eradication only removes a single instance of crops 
from play, from the farmer’s perspective, leaving him with little alternative but to replant 
another crop soon thereafter. In the face of no alternatives, farmers are forced to remain a 
link in the chain of drug cultivation and will do so until a more feasible crop is made 
available. This begs the question of what crop will provide the same level of financial 
gain to a farmer. 
In addition to failing to provide alternative crops, this approach fosters other 
problems concerning farmers, namely forced displacement, health risks, and 
                                                 
26 Maria Lemus, Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh, “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War.” In Drugs 
and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, edited by Youngers, Coletta and Eileen Rosin, 99–142. 
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27 Ibid., 112–13. 
28 Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, U.S. Drug Policy: At What Cost? Moving Beyond the Self-
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environmental deterioration. As highlighted by a 2005 U.S. Congressional Research 
Service report shows that agencies in France, China and the United States found that 
many of the chemical components contained in herbicide fumigation sprays were 
devastatingly harmful not only to plant life, but also to human placental cells and 
wildlife, raising questions to their feasibility in for use in inhabited areas.30  Additional 
reports by the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) and Ramirez Lemus, Stanton 
and Walsh provide complementary evidence that aerial fumigation has resulted in a rise 
in complaints by farmers regarding health complaints and forced displacement.31  
Ramirez Lemus, et al., cite reports by the Colombian Council for Human Rights and 
Displacement which “show estimates that in 2001 and 2002 alone, fumigation led to the 
displacement of more than 75,000 people nationwide,” further bolstering the impact of 
unintended consequences associated with SS tactics.32 
This brings us to the fourth source of criticism regarding unintended 
consequences of SS programs; namely human rights abuses. Multiple authors show that 
historically, counterdrug policies have provided little measures to ensure that 
international human rights norms were observed by military and law enforcement 
personnel.33  For instance, increased participation of military forces in internal 
counterinsurgency operations in Colombia combined with the inclusion of drug 
production and trafficking under the umbrella of national security, produced a system in 
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Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0419/2004014978.html,1–61. 
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which military forces were provided funding and autonomy, but few control measures.34  
Additionally, a report by the CRS, authored by June Beittel, shows that increased 
militarization of Mexican police forces, operating in counterdrug capacities, rendered 
higher instances of human rights abuses in 2007–09.35  Further reports by Human Rights 
Watch, an international non-governmental organization that specializes in revealing 
human rights abuses, published a 2009 report detailing over seventeen cases in which 
more than seventy Mexican citizens were brutalized at the hands of the military, 
including rape, torture, and forced disappearances.36 
Furthermore, critics have argued that the stated objectives for anti-drug policies 
have not been met, and yet these policies persist. One poignant example is found in 
Renee Scherlen’s aforementioned work The Never-Ending Drug War, in which she 
defines drug war policy termination as “the deliberate conclusion or cessation of 
government policies and programs related to the prohibitionist approach to drug use; the 
continuation of prohibition but with a harm reduction emphasis would be considered 
partial termination.”37  Following the line of thought established by U.S. SS policy, 
Scherlen finds that instead of price increase and consumption decrease (the delineated 
objectives defined by U.S. national drug strategies), the opposite has in fact occurred. 
Additional research examined in “Drug War Politics: the Price of Denial” shows that not 
only has consumption increased in the United States, but the street price of illicit drugs 
has steadily declined, while purity has increased from the late 1970s through the early  
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1990s.38  The vast difference between stated objectives and achieved results leaves critics 
questioning the validity of continuing such policies, in the face of pointedly contrary 
data. 
The final point of contention for SS programs is fairly straightforward: it allows 
no room for alternative methods. This contention argues that anti-drug proponents are far 
too invested in the logic of reducing supply (via eradication and interdiction) and have 
become entrenched in their position, to the extent that other potential avenues of progress 
are largely ignored. Even in instances where methods that did not involve eradication or 
interdiction were specifically highlighted in anti-drug plans, the resulting funds allocated 
for these policy aspects was far less than the direct action counterdrug operations. For 
example, in 2008 GAO reported that for Plan Colombia, “since fiscal year 2000, [U.S. 
Departments of] State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian 
military and National Police… [but U.S. Departments of] State and Justice, and USAID 
have provided $1.3 billion for… social, economic, and justice sector programs.”39  This is 
ironic, considering that the U.S. DoS “has primary responsibility for coordinating the 
Mérida Initiative.”40  Other counterdrug plans, including the MI, have been cited as 
further evidence of proponents clinging to a focus on eradication and interdiction.  
A 2011 policy briefing from the Center for International Policy (CIP) claims that despite 
an agreement between the United States and Mexico to shape MI efforts around four 
major pillars, including “dismantling criminal organizations, strengthening law 
enforcement institutions, building a ‘21st century border,’ and building strong and 
resilient communities,” the bulk of U.S. funding has been “channeled primarily to 
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support the first two ‘pillars’ both in Mexico and Central America.”41  In discussing two 
of the largest anti-drug policies, critics propose that the bulk of funding has been directed 
towards the more military route of affecting the drug trade, even in policies that have 
stated explicitly that the respective program will include civil sector action. 
Proponents of SS policies are far easier to group. On the whole, this camp relies 
upon the evidence of continued eradication and interdiction statistics to provide ongoing 
funding for such programs. In a statement before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and the Law, David T. Johnson (Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) provided the following testimony 
concerning the MI: “Mexico’s recent high-profile seizures and arrests are clear signs that 
this effort is moving in the right direction,” and that “the lessons learned from our 
experiences in Colombia… are reflected in our efforts in Mexico.”42  Johnson’s relief, 
William R. Brownfield, made similar remarks to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, beginning his testimony by listing three 
major successes of the MI:  
1. Since 2009, more than 33 high level cartel leaders have been removed 
or arrested. This compares with one in the preceding six years. 
2. Thanks to Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government now has 14 
additional helicopters, hundreds of sophisticated non-intrusive inspection 
suites of equipment, and more than 100 canine teams. 
3. More than 52,000 Mexican police and prosecutors have received some 
professional training under the Mérida Initiative. 
By the end of this year, we will have delivered more than $900 million 
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delivered this year alone. There is no doubt in my mind, ladies and 
gentlemen, that the United States is better and safer today thanks to our 
support for the Mérida Initiative.43 
 
Such instances show that governmental and official firmly believe that ongoing 
operations are effective and merit further long-term consideration. Additionally, in 2006 
the DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) released 
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which stated that “cutting off [the] 
supply [of illicit drugs] has been and will continue to be our primary international 
narcotics goal,”  owing to the success of “coordinated international enforcement 
programs [that] limited drug crop expansion, strengthened interdiction efforts, destroyed 
processing facilities, and weakened major trafficking organizations.”44  The same agency 
released a more recent report in 2012 that stated similar support for SS measures, citing 
multiple successes in Latin America, specifically a reported fourteen and seven percent 
reduction in coca plants and cocaine in Colombia, respectively, and the arrest of  
“10,979 Mexican nationals and 218 foreigners on drug-related charges, including  
22 high-profile drug traffickers.45  The 2012 report also touted the successes of U.S. DEA 
and U.S. Coast Guard antidrug operations, listing the victories in over ten pages of 
material.46  The second point extracted from SS patrons reveals that many have admitted 
the inclusion of demand-side elements, despite critics’ contention that such measures 
have received only the vaguest level of attention. In multiple sources, including the 
aforementioned International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, as well as reports to 
Congress, the inclusion of additional measures, besides eradication and interdiction, are 
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46 Ibid., 43–57. 
 16
necessary.47  Even previously discussed testimonies by highly placed federal agents 
mention successes in implementing professionalized education. Nonetheless, thus far, it 
appears that the major dialogue from sponsors of this approach holds eradication and 
interdiction as the principal means to wage the war on drugs, and other forms of action 
are lesser by comparison. 
In sum, the totality of information garnered from the research shows a marked 
difference between the predominant opinions of scientists and officials regarding SS 
policies. It is notable that certain concepts, such as alternative measures, like drug 
treatment and public health awareness, are commented on by both camps, but in very 
different lights. While critics argue for less invasive courses of action and reshaping 
current policies to at least include accountability measures, it appears that proponents see 
these same topics as peripheral elements at best. This thesis will seek to examine both 
camps, in order to more accurately portray the landscape of drug policy and shed light on 
the merits of both sides. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis of SS anti-drug 
policies and practices in Latin America, specifically examining the development of 
programs such as the MI. Particular attention will be paid to the MI and its comparison to 
historical practices, to see how this policy has been shaped, as well as how the 
implementation has affected its success to increase drug prices and reduce consumption. 
By focusing on the MI, specifically in the two periods of 2007–08 and 2009–10, it will be 
possible to ascertain the effectiveness of the campaign in stemming drug consumption 
and increasing narcotics’ street prices. The first period will serve as the basis for drug 
price, purity, supply and consumption, representing the early years of the MI and its first  
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steps to affect the drug market. During the second period, the MI was fully operational 
and research during this timeframe should provide ample evidence of its impact upon 
drug trafficking. 
I will utilize resources outlined in the literature review, including governmental 
resources, data generated by international organization, as well as primary and secondary 
sources from reputable organizations, including the U.S. government and its agencies, 
and the United Nations and associated Latin American non-governmental organizations. I 
will also rely on secondary sources, including work by peer-reviewed scholars and 
reputable academic organizations, such as the Washington Office for Latin America, the 
Council on Foreign Relations and the RAND Corporation. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is structured into three chapters. Chapter II, which follows from this 
introductory chapter, will offer a historical background analysis of SS anti-drug effort in 
Latin America, specifically focusing on the role played by the United States. Chapter III 
will examine the ways in which the MI elements were implemented, including funding, 
timeliness, and successes and failures of the program. Where Chapter II provides a 
refined overview to the topic of counter-narcotics policy through the MI, Chapter III 
brings together the elements of the MI’s execution and displays which areas merit future 
consideration and which should be excluded. The final chapter summarizes the main 
findings of this study and offers specific policy prescriptions for the future. 
  
 18




II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE 
MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the political environment preceding the Mérida Initiative 
(MI) and provides a brief timeline of Congressional discussions, hearings, and testimony 
leading up to its creation. It provides an analysis of how the (MI) was shaped, including 
the impact of preceding events and political discourse both in Mexico and the United 
States. Understanding the origins of the MI is essential in answering the major research 
question; namely, how effective has the program been at affecting drug prices and 
narcotic consumption. The MI origins are found in anti-narcotics efforts by the United 
States to combat “organizations [that] constitute a threat to regional security and to U.S. 
national security.”48  As stated in the previous chapter, the program was initially built 
upon by the experience of the United States in combatting drug trafficking in Colombia 
and the Andean Region, a largely supply-side (SS) focused campaign. As outlined by 
Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, SS approaches operate under the presumption that 
“reducing supply will make the illicit drug trade more dangerous and costly. This in tum 
is assumed to drive down production, drive up prices, and ultimately discourage… 
citizens from buying and using illicit drugs.”49  However, U.S. policy then focused more 
attention on its southwestern border than in previous years, and as a result, other concepts 
were included in the new MI design. Specifically, it established that border security and 
community resources were necessary to combat drug trafficking. The MI was specifically 
designed to address the rising threat of organized crime. This took place in the aftermath 
of 9/11 terrorist attacks, which prompted the American government to reassess its 
relationship with Mexico in a new light, considering the potential connections between 
terrorist organizations and organized crime, especially illegal narcotics trade.   
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As indicated in the previous chapter, former presidents George W. Bush and 
Felipe Calderon signed the MI in the fall of 2007. However, coordination to place 
Mexican agents and U.S. supporting personnel on the ground did not occur until 2008. 
The United States Department of State (DOS) provided overall responsibility for the 
campaign, but elements of the plan, including appropriation account administration and 
implementation, fell to other departments including the Department of Defense and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to be discussed later. 
Additionally, complementary programs such as the Improved Border Inspection program 
and the Asset Forfeiture Program have been created in the overall contribution to the MI, 
but are administered by their parent agencies, the Departments of Homeland Security and 
Justice, respectively.50 
In this chapter, I will provide a brief historical analysis of the MI. First, I will 
place particular emphasis on how similar SS programs, such as Plan Colombia, provided 
a template and framework for the U.S.-Mexico initiative. Second, I discuss how U.S. 
anti-terrorist strategies in the aftermath of 9/11 prompted an increased interest in 
safeguarding the southern border. This sudden interest in border security, as evidenced in 
Congressional testimonies, also helped influence and shape the MI. Finally I examine 
how the policy preferences of the Calderon administration ultimately affected the 
structure and configuration of the U.S.-Mexico anti-drug plan. My overall goal is simply 
to identify the political background conditions under which the MI was created, which 
should then allow me to assess its impact and effectiveness.    
B. THE IMPACT OF PLAN COLOMBIA 
No examination of the MI would be complete without a discussion of its SS 
predecessor, Plan Colombia, under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). Likewise, a 
basic comparison of the two campaigns is necessary to understand where the two plans 
differ. The presence of Plan Colombia in U.S. counternarcotics policy greatly contributed 
to the shaping and eventual execution of the MI. The impetus for Plan Colombia 
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stemmed from increased coca cultivation in the 1990s, as production shifted from initial 
primary producers in Peru and Bolivia, because of eradication campaigns and increased 
interdiction. This resulted in the aforementioned “balloon effect,” wherein pressure 
applied to reduce coca production areas forced cultivation into neighboring Colombia.51  
As a result of this shift in coca production, Colombian cartels increased their cocaine 
trade exponentially. Shifting away from protective measures on agriculture, open market 
policies in the 1990s forced subsistence farmers to focus on rising economic enterprises 
in coca growth.52  As the illicit drug industry expanded its global reach, other affected 
nations took a larger interest in trade sources, particularly the United States. Specifically, 
Washington strengthened its resolve towards abolishing drug trafficking and created a 
shared perspective of understanding with Colombia (later known as Plan Colombia) 
regarding the impact of the drug trade. The threat posed by drug trafficking prompted 
both nations to cooperate and propose a common framework for action. Under this shared 
vision, the two nations implemented SS policies in the Andean region to scour the terrain 
for cultivation sites and eradicate crops.   
Plan Colombia was designed after years of increased bilateral tension with 
Bogota, stemming mostly from the controversial certification process. In fact, the United 
States revoked Colombia’s certification as a nation with stable mechanisms to withstand 
and remove corruption from its officials in 1995 and withdrew $35 million in anti-
narcotics funding. The decertification process forced Colombian officials, particularly 
incumbent President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002), to reconsider their efforts to present a 
solid national anti-drug stance.53 Pastrana thus approached the U.S. government and 
suggested a new course of action to Washington. Initially Colombia proposed the Plan as 
a peace initiative designed to de-escalate conflict between Colombian security forces and 
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the guerrilla. The overarching goal was to facilitate the development of “productive 
processes, the promotion of human capital, the construction of a peace infrastructure, the 
strengthening of social capital and the promotion of environmental sustainability,” 54  
with minimal inclusion of military means. Nevertheless, the United States wanted a SS 
campaign, focused on interdiction and eradication, and pressured Colombia to adjust its 
demands. As such, U.S. anti-drug advocates and advisors visited Colombia to investigate 
the situational feasibility of implementing Pastrana’s fledgling Plan Colombia. Upon 
completing the assessment, they recommended Pastrana’s advisors to increase the scope 
of the proposal to include a wider linkage with larger guerrilla and drug trafficking 
organization strategy, including a notable increase in military participation.55  Hence, 
Plan Colombia or Plan for Peace, Prosperity and Strengthening of the State (its official 
title), was born as a six-year strategy centered primarily on ending drug trafficking, with 
peripheral restoration of social and economic development.56  The plan aligned with U.S. 
interests and was comprised of ten essential strategy elements for future execution: 
economic, fiscal/financial, military, judicial and human rights, counter-narcotics, 
alternative development, social participation, human development, peace, and 
international.57  The plan effectively ensured that Colombia would receive long-term 
U.S. funding to combat insurgency and anti-drug efforts.58  The trend of linking counter-
guerrilla and anti-drug efforts continued into and through the first decade of the new 
millennium by Pastrana’s successor, Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002–2010). Plan Colombia set 
a standard whereby anti-narcotics and counterinsurgency tactics were combined, leaving 
an important precedent for the MI. Uribe blamed guerrillas for the nation’s economic 
disparity and public insecurity, allowing him to increase the presence of military forces 
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involved in the plan. In fact, Uribe revised the plan itself, changing its title to “Plan for 
Democratic Security,” which de facto increased military means to combat insurgents, 
relying mostly on U.S. funds and resources.59  Uribe’s replacement, Juan Manuel Santos, 
took office in 2010, continuing his predecessor’s work in combatting crime and drug 
trafficking.60  He continued operations of Plan Colombia, which by now was simply 
referred to as the National Consolidation Plan (NCP). The NCP combines drug 
eradication efforts with a “whole-of-government approach” 61 towards ending 
insurgencies, further increasing militarization. 
As stated earlier, Plan Colombia influenced U.S. anti-drug policies in Mexico.62  
At face value, Plan Colombia seems almost parochial in its SS approach to anti-drug 
actions, while the MI was designed to apply a more contemporary focus on illicit 
trafficking. In theory, the MI takes a less overt militarily inclined position, while Plan 
Colombia took a direct route to the military option with regard to achieving policy ends. 
Plan Colombia initially focused towards peace, with emphasis on cultural, economic,  
and social improvement and stability, but U.S. influence swayed its course before 
implementation, yielding current practices centered on interdiction and eradication. The 
MI applies effort across a broader front, including interdiction and military means, as 
well as control measures in the transportation, shipping, and border security elements. 
Mexican and U.S. leaders realized from Plan Colombia that interdiction and eradication 
efforts in Mexico would require complementary public welfare and infrastructural 
measures to fully engage the effects of illegal narcotics trafficking. Realizing the slanted 
focus of Plan Colombia, MI developers saw the opportunity to not only stifle drug 
trafficking at it source, but also impede its approaches to major markets external to 
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Mexico.63  Additionally, the MI was designed to apply measures to heal societal causes 
for resorting to drug trafficking, including judicial reforms to eliminate corruption, as 
well as socio-cultural measures to combat the entrance of future generations into the drug 
trade.    
Some of the lessons learned from Plan Colombia include time lag in 
effectiveness, the importance of addressing soft-side issues, and the unintended 
consequence of militarization and associated human rights abuses. From Plan Colombia, 
policy makers realized that it would take time to affect the production capital and power 
base of drug trafficking organizations.64  Because Plan Colombia applied a heavy use of 
force in a short time, the MI was understood to be an initial investment in a much 
lengthier time frame.65  Additionally, where Plan Colombia neglected to provide support 
for soft-side areas like “investment in social capital, infrastructure, and productive 
projects,”66 the MI would pointedly include those items into its design.67  Lastly, the 
United States and Mexico did not want to see a repeat of the human rights abuses 
committed by the military and paramilitary forces, as occurred in Colombia.68  As a 
result, the MI specifically highlighted the need for Mexico to devote effort to ensure that 
international human rights norms were observed. These required efforts to provide human 
rights training for military and police personnel, as well as a review of all personnel 
found guilty of such violations and prosecution where applicable, including military units 
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as a whole.69 U.S. officials thought the unintended consequences of SS programs (which 
were notorious in Colombia) could be minimized in Mexico by imposing stricter 
guidelines. However, gross human rights violations were indeed committed in Mexico, in 
spite of the guidelines stated in the MI. The U.S.-Mexico plan, like its Colombian 
counterpart, lacked enforcement and accountability mechanisms.70 
C. CONGRESSIONAL/SENATE HEARINGS: THE UNITED STATES 
Available documents from Congress allow us to see the overarching mindset that 
permeated the United States legislature leading up to the MI, and thereby we can surmise 
the ways in which the MI was shaped. These Congressional findings prior to MI’s 
introduction reveal a prevalent environment that existed before the approval and resulting 
implementation of this plan, in which it is possible to see a rise in the attention garnered 
by counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico. Public documents published by Congress display 
an increasing sense of urgency to take action in the years following the September, 2001 
terrorist attacks.71  Specifically, Congressional reports confirm that counter-insurgency 
and combatting terrorist organizations were firmly correlated with counter-narcotics 
efforts abroad.72  Indeed, U.S. response to terrorist activity prompted an increased 
interest in combatting narcotics. As early as late 2001, Congressional documents 
specifically cite the need for stronger measures to combat the two-fold issue of narcotics 
trafficking and terrorism.73  Over $90 million were provided in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 
“for acquisition and other expenses associated with implementation and deployment of 
antiterrorist and illicit narcotics detection equipment along the United States-Mexico 
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border, the United States-Canada border, and Florida and the Gulf Coast seaports.”74  Of 
the $90 million provided for the antiterrorist and counter-narcotics efforts, fifty-five 
percent ($49.604 million) went specifically to protect the U.S.-Mexico border.75  The 
report continues, stating that the “Committee [on Ways and Means] is committed to 
giving Customs the resources needed to increase the overall level of Customs officers and 
Special Agents dedicated to countering terrorism, narcotics, and money laundering 
activities.”76  In 2002, a presidential proposal for reorganizing the U.S. homeland defense 
infrastructure foreshadowed future perceptions of Congress regarding terrorism, border 
security, and drug trafficking.77 Congressional hearing testimonies specifically discuss 
the need to increase funds for counter-drug operations in order to reduce the terrorist 
threat.78 
Furthermore, reports from legislative hearings from 2004 clearly indicate that 
congressional leaders supported measures to strengthen the southwestern border’s 
defensive posture, putting particular emphasis on deterring and interdicting the flow of 
illegal drugs into the United States.79  In a report released by the House Select Committee 
on Homeland Security, major security failures were identified as a result of the porous 
nature of the southwestern U.S. in particular, it was noted that the counter-narcotics and 
counter-terrorism programs lacked sufficient infrastructure, manning, technology, and 
intelligence to combat organized crime; thus suggesting the need for an improved, long-
term strategy.80  In 2005, Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agencies to conduct risk assessments of all 
United States ports of entry for the purpose of “preventing the entry of terrorists, other 
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unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband into the United 
States.”81  Likewise, in 2006, Congress once again released more findings concerning the 
importance of increased counter-narcotics operations, specifically regarding the 
cultivation of positive relations within communities affected by drug trafficking. It cites a 
need for counter-narcotics agencies to nourish this relationship in order to effectively 
combat drug-trafficking organizations.82  Hence, the U.S. Congress itself clearly 
connected anti-terrorist strategies with anti-narcotic policies, especially in the border. The 
2006 Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act  highlights the 
increased resolve of Congress to support ongoing measures by the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to publish and execute the United States Southwest 
Border Counter-narcotics Strategy, specifically focused on “the [United States] 
Government’s strategy for preventing the illegal trafficking of drugs across the 
international border between the United States and Mexico, including through ports of 
entry and between ports of entry on that border.”83  By officially directing the ONDCP to 
continue counter-narcotics operations and providing it the latitude to identify “resources 
required to enable the relevant National Drug Control Program agencies to implement 
that strategy,” Congress displayed its commitment to escalating the U.S. national 
response to the perceived threat posed by drug trafficking.84   The combination of the 
above reports and hearings show that the perceived level of effort required to combat 
drug trafficking and its associated links with terrorism were greatly increased in the 
minds of U.S. decision makers. By linking terrorism and drug trafficking, U.S. leaders 
constructed an environment wherein increased attention to one element (counter-
terrorism) would garner greater support for the other (counter-narcotics) and vice versa.  
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As such, Congress was primed to create a plan of action to provide a more 
comprehensive direct response to the threat posed by the illegal narcotics trade, leading to 
the creation of the MI. 
D. MEXICO’S POLICY PREFERENCES AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
MERIDA INITIATIVE 
The impetus for the MI did not stem from unilateral U.S. efforts, but was greatly 
driven by Mexican leaders, beginning with President Vicente Fox (2000–2006). President 
Fox, the first democratically elected leader of Mexico after 75 years of authoritarian PRI-
rule, took office in 2000, and quickly garnered approval from many Republicans in the 
U.S. Congress to assist him with anti-drug operations. His attitudes towards fighting 
“drug trafficking and money laundering made him appealing to Washington, as did the 
fact that he represented… a clean break from the long-entrenched and heavily corrupted 
PRI [in previous years].”85  Fox quickly began to build a stronger U.S./Mexico 
relationship by forging stronger, less restricted trade access and greater ties to the United 
States. President Bush accepted Fox’s invitation and met with him in San Cristobal, 
Mexico in February 2001, to discuss a “Partnership for Prosperity” that would enhance 
U.S. investment in Mexico.86  This meeting began a dialogue between the two nations 
that would signal the start of increased cooperation and interaction, and would eventually 
pave the way for the MI. The two state leaders continued to discuss differences on larger 
issues like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as politically 
sensitive issues like immigration. The progression of these discussions eventually led to 
policy changes in both nations and the creation of a “joint border security program, which 
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Mexican concessions to “stop migrants before they crossed into hazardous [border 
crossing] regions,”88 and U.S. agreements to address problems caused by its border 
policies.   
The events of 9/11 did, however, affect U.S.-Mexico cooperative efforts, as 
Washington turned its attention to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly, 
the United States began to impose stricter controls on immigration and border security, 
creating both the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security 
Act.89  Both items eroded the U.S./Mexico relationship, as the Bush administration rarely 
consulted these measures bilaterally with its Mexican counterpart. The relationship was 
further hindered by Mexico’s refusal to support a U.S. resolution on the United Nations 
Security Council in 2003 to allow U.S. troops to enter Iraq.90  Meanwhile in the United 
States, domestic demands for immigration legislation clashed with Mexico’s expectations 
for an overhaul immigration reform. The friendly and mostly cordial relationship between 
the Bush and Fox administrations was ultimately affected and undermined by post-9/11 
security concerns. As a result, discussions about enhanced anti-drug trafficking bilateral 
cooperation did not formally take off until President Felipe Calderon took office in 
Mexico, in 2006. Under Calderon, the “amigo” relationship was revitalized, as the 
interconnected nature of the two nations became highlighted in economic trade and 
cooperative security strategies. 
The Calderon administration made a case by emphasizing the increased spike in 
drug-related crime and violence, especially in its northern border.91  For instance, at least 
8,000 deaths caused by organized crime were reported in 2007.92  This highlighted the 
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fear that conflict would spill over to the U.S.-side of the border.93  In response, Mexican 
leaders began to take drastic action to reverse the violent trend. For example, President 
Felipe Calderon ordered 45,000 Mexican Army soldiers to join the effort to combat the 
illicit drug trade and restore public security during his first two years in office.94  This 
internal fracturing caused by criminal organizations presented a situation to Mexico in 
which the ongoing impact of illegal narcotics necessitated a change in policy and 
practice. President Calderon sought to provide a more comprehensive response to the 
problem of the illicit drug trade by partnering with the United States. The result was an 
earnest effort by Mexico to actively involve the United States in its anti-drug campaign 
via a joint security framework. In this endeavor, Mexico would, for the first time since 
World War II, seek to collaborate militarily with the United States on equal footing, 
under an umbrella of shared responsibilities to eradicate the common threat posed by 
drug trafficking.   
Under the Mexican diplomatic initiative, the presidents of Mexico and the United 
States met in Mérida, Yucatan, in March of 2007 and began discussions of a common 
anti-drug plan.95 During those meetings, President Calderon declared that he was fully 
satisfied for how fruitful this meeting has been for both countries… We coincided in 
sharing our core responsibility, which now, more than ever, happened to be a shared 
responsibility.”96  The first draft of what would later be called the MI was publically 
released a few weeks after the bilateral talks in Mérida for legislative.97 However, 
Congressional approval was not easy and the first draft of the MI faced increased 
opposition from both sides.   
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For instance, Washington wanted to impose conditions on the funding 
appropriations for the plan to ensure compliance with international norms regarding 
human rights. In particular, prerequisites for supplying U.S. funds to Mexico were 
required to be verified by the Office of the President before funds could be released.98  
These conditions included requirements to: 
1) Ensure that “members and units of the armed forces and law 
enforcement agencies of the foreign country have not been involved in 
human rights violations.” 
2) Investigate and prosecute “any member of any government agency or 
entity receiving assistance under [the Mérida Initiative] who has been 
credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations on or after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.” 
3) Create commissions to conduct investigation and prosecution (if 
necessary) in reports of human rights abuses.99 
These requirements were naturally opposed by Mexico, who saw this as an 
attempt to once again institutionalize a controversial “certification program for narcotics-
producing and transit countries in Latin America.”100  Under certification, the U.S. 
President would certify that drug producing and transit nations in Latin America were 
indeed complying with requirements, including establishing systems to address and 
reduce human rights abuses, and associated institutional reforms.101 Mexico perceived 
these conditions as an infringement to its sovereignty. For instance, Ruth Zavaleta, 
coordinator of the lower house of Congress for the leftist Party of the Democratic 
Revolution, rejected the plan, saying “We are the first ones to defend the idea that 
Mexico needs these reforms, along with advances in human rights… but the United 
States cannot make unilateral demands.”102 Bilateral negotiations resumed again in in 
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2008 to discuss the most controversial issues regarding the implementation of a joint anti-
drug plan. The U.S. conceded to Mexican political demands, and the new draft clearly 
stated that the MI would fully respect Mexican and international law.103  As a result, the 
MI preserved Mexican sovereignty and did not impose a certification process to enforce 
full compliance with human rights requirements. The plan was ultimately approved by 
both nations and signed into law in June of 2008.  
The MI contains four pillars of action: (1) Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups, 
(2) Strengthen Institutions, (3) Build a 21st Century Border, and (4) Build Strong and 
Resilient Communities.104 Under the first pillar, the plan focuses on seizing drug trade, 
interdicting illegal arms trafficking, and intelligence exchange between the two 
governments. The second pillar focuses on criminal justice reforms in Mexico, including 
professionalization of police and prosecutors, systems development, reform of existing 
corrections infrastructure and policy, and professional exchanges to increase Mexican 
capacity to fight organized crime. Pillar three incorporates the professionalization of 
Mexican police and federal forces exhibited in pillar two, along with U.S. aid, to obtain 
more sophisticated and less intrusive technology. The final pillar highlights the 
importance of demand reduction for illegal drugs through stronger communities that can 
better resist the effects of illegal trafficking, while promoting a “culture of lawfulness” 
that is (in theory) impervious to the temptations of such illicit behavior.105  Additionally, 
the MI provides additional U.S. resources to Mexican authorities, primarily in the form of 
technical trainers for the aforementioned professionalization, funds and technology to 
reinforce communications systems and networks that gather information on drug 
organizations, as well as multiple helicopters and surveillance aircraft for use in 
interdiction operations.106 
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Based on the Congressional reports and their findings discussed above concerning 
a heightened awareness for the threat posed by illegal drug trafficking and its connections 
to terrorism, we can overlay this information to the monies allocated to the MI. In doing 
so, we will be able to understand which elements of the plan were most important based 
on their level of funding. Table 1 shows the initial breakdown of funds requested for the 
program for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the first two years of establishment and 
execution of the MI. 
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From the table, we can see that the bulk of the funding went to provide resources 
for Mexico, most notably its efforts in the avenues of counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, 
border security, and public security and law enforcement. Seventy-two percent ($362.4 
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million) of the total funding ($500 million) for MI operations is focused in areas typical 
to SS counter-narcotics efforts, such as interdiction and eradication. Conversely, only 
twenty-eight percent ($137.6 million) was allocated for building and strengthening 
support structures such as institution building and program support. Additional reports, 
such as the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110–252) show 
that the United States would transfer Mexico $352 million in FY2008 (supplemental 
assistance) and $48 million in FY2009 (bridge fund supplemental assistance), again  
most notably in the areas given the greatest attention: counter-narcotics and 
counterterrorism.108  The largest portion of MI resources, not surprisingly, is focused on 
the direct action areas of counter-narcotics.   
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has analyzed the origins of the MI by examining the impact of Plan 
Colombia and other related efforts in the region. Past counter-narcotics history with 
Colombia influenced U.S. decisions to include measures in the MI beyond the scope of 
normal SS tactics. In an effort to avoid some of the human rights violations encountered 
under Plan Colombia, these new measures were included to ensure a more 
comprehensive response to the threat posed by illegal narcotics trafficking. Further, the 
measures were intended to address both societal issues within Mexican culture and 
immigration, as well as a restructuring of the capabilities of police and judiciary forces to 
deal with the influx of drug-related crime. Likewise, I have emphasized how the MI was 
approved in the context dominated by 9/11 concerns, in which government officials 
linked anti-terrorist policies to anti-narcotics efforts. Heightened awareness and concern 
for national security pushed the United States to group the two concepts and as a result, 
the MI’s funding concentrated on direct action elements of the plan; namely, interdiction 
and eradication. The increased sense of urgency resulting from terrorist attacks urged the 
United States to provide a rapid, concentrated response. It also caused the United States 
to reevaluate its partnership with Mexico, considering the shared threat of drug 
trafficking by the two nations.   
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I have also analyzed how the Mexican involvement shaped the final composition 
of the MI. Without the request and persistent efforts of Mexican legislature, the MI may 
never have been fully approved. Mexican legislature worked not only to improve its 
relationship with the United States, but also to create a shared perspective, based on the 
threat from drug trafficking to both nations. Mexico’s efforts to work through contested 
issues within initial drafts of the MI and achieve a more equitable position with the 
United States provided a significant presence in the drive to achieve legislative approval. 
The plan represents a critical juncture in U.S.-Mexico relations, representing a significant 
advancement of cooperative partnerships in North America to fight drug trafficking. The 
result of this inter-parliamentary discourse between the respective nations was a plan that 
addressed the scope of drug trafficking, from interdiction and social welfare to judicial 
procedure. This finalized plan showed the intentions and commitment of each nation to 
wholeheartedly provide assets and effort to fight a combined international campaign. 
Despite the efforts of Mexico and the United States to establish a comprehensive plan to 
fight drug trafficking, the overall appropriation and timeliness of funds prevented it from 
having strong mechanisms for accountability and transparency. The next chapter will 
discuss the implementation and effectiveness of the MI. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION, SHAPE OF THE INITIATIVE,  
AND RESULTS 
In order to properly ascertain the impact of counter-narcotics operations under the 
Mérida Initiative (MI), this thesis will consider two periods: 2007–2008 and 2009–2010. 
Two factors greatly affected the impact of the MI: timing and shape (as a function of 
funding). According to Congressional Research reports, the MI was only first intended to 
be a three-year program, with funding to “begin in [Fiscal Year] FY2008 and last through 
FY2010.”109  This thesis examines international and U.S. trends in drug markets during 
these years. Primary concern is given to the impact of funding in shaping the MI, as well 
as how the timing of resources affected the effectiveness of the campaign. The first 
period represents the start of the MI, as forces were only beginning to coalesce under the 
cooperative Mexico/U.S. umbrella of operations. The second period represents the first 
two years in which the MI assets should have been largely implemented and provides an 
adequate example of the effects of a fully working program. Comparisons of drug trends 
within the two periods will provide a more thorough understanding of the impact of the 
MI on the trafficking of illegal narcotics. This is important because Mexico is one of the 
largest producers and shipping routes for illicit drugs, and the United States is the largest 
consumer in the world. According to the edict of supply-side counter-drug logic, if the 
MI was successful, then drug prices should increase and usage and purity decline.110  
Conversely, if MI actions have been ineffective, then the reverse relationship should 
prevail. 
A. WHERE DID THE MONEY GO? WHAT EFFECT DID THIS HAVE? 
As discussed in Chapter II, initial funding for the MI was focused more toward 
typical supply-side procedures, including interdiction and eradication. In considering this 
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relationship between funding and the shape of the MI, we must examine the timeliness of 
resource application, based on procured assets. Table 2 shows that funding for the MI 
was not largely achieved until after the end of the FY09 cycle.111  In fact, according to 
information supplied by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in Table 2, the 
obligated balance, representing unliquidated contract amounts, was not fully expended 
until 2009.  
Table 2.   Initiative Funding Status as of September 30, 2009112 ($ in millions) 
Funding Source Appropriateda Obligated Balanceb Expended Balancec 
FY08 Supplemental $400.0 375.1 24.2 
FY09 Omnibus 300.0 41.0 0 
FY09 Supplemental 420.0 336.5 0 
Total for Mexico $1,120 $752.6 $24.2 
Source: GAO Report GAO-10–253R, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative 
Note: Appropriated funds give budget authority to incur obligations and to make payments from the 
Treasury for specified purposes. Obligations are commitments that create a legal liability of the United 
States government for the payment of goods and services ordered or received. Expenditures are funds that 
have been spent. 
a
Includes amounts appropriated “to combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and 
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities” in these countries, amounts 
Congressionally directed for programs in these countries, and amounts allocated by State to fund MI 
activities. For the purposes of this report, we consider “to combat drug trafficking and related violence and 
organized crime, and for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities” to be 
MI activities.  
b
Although the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) reports both its bulk 
obligations and sub-obligations to the Office of Management and Budget, its bulk obligations, as the first 
record of a legal liability to pay for goods and services, are what we are reporting as its obligations. 
Obligated balance refers to unliquidated obligations.  
c
In the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act (Pub. L. No. 110–252), Congress appropriated $352 
million into various accounts “to combat drug trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and for 
judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities” in Mexico during the first year 
of the MI, in addition to $48 million for the same purposes during the second year of the MI, which is 
referred to as the FY2009 Supplemental Bridge. 
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Specifically, this information shows that of the $1.12 billion appropriated to 
Mexico for the MI, only 33 percent of the obligated funds (via contracts) were fulfilled 
by 2009. This means that approximately 67 percent ($752.6 million) of those contracts 
under obligation were still awaiting liquidation to purchase assets. This has three 
important ramifications. First, this reduces the effectiveness of Mexican operatives to 
bring the full weight of their respective agencies to bear upon criminals within the 
organizations trafficking in illegal narcotics. According to a 2010 memorandum from 
U.S. Congressional representative Chris Smith to the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere, “only nine percent of the $1.6 billion promised under the MI from 
2008 to 2010 has actually been spent, and little more than forty-six percent of the funds 
have been obligated.”113  Mexican personnel did not receive the majority of equipment 
and training mandated by the MI until the fall of 2009, as shown in Table 3.114  Further 
reports to Congress show that crucial assets, such as the “biometric equipment, 
immigration computer equipment and software, forensics lab equipment, and canines” 
were not fully accessible to Mexican forces until the spring of 2010.115  Even direct line 
items initially delineated for the campaign, such as the Bell helicopters for the Mexican 
Army, took over a year to procure after the initial appropriation of funds for the MI, as 
shown in Table 4.116  Considering that a major goal for the Mexican Army was 
interdiction and eradication via aerial means, this severely limited its ability to execute a 
primary objective of the MI.  
 
                                                 
113 Chris Smith. Assessing the Merida Initiative: Report from the GAO, edited by Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Government Printing Office, 2010, 39. 
114 United States Government Accountability Office. Merida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures: Report to Congressional Requesters. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2010, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo9923, 8. 
115 Jess T. Ford, United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere and United States Government Accountability Office. “Mérida Initiative the United States Needs Better 
Performance Measures for Its Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support Efforts: Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 
2. 
116 Jess T. Ford, United States and Government Accountability Office. “Status of Funds for the Mérida 
Initiative.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS120026, 13. 
 40
Table 3.   Selected Equipment and Training Delivered Under the Mérida Initiative, as 
of March 31, 2010117 
Equipment Delivery date 
26 armored vehicles May 2009 
62 Plataforma Mexico computer servers June 2009 
Training equipment Jul. & Dec. 2009 
5 X-ray vans August 2009 
OASISS servers and software August 2009 
Biometric equipment Sept. 2009 & Jan. 2010 
Document verification software September 2009 
Ballistic tracing equipment (IBIS) September 2009 
30 ion scanners October 2009 
Rescue communication equipment & training Oct. & Nov. 2009 
Personal protective equipment Oct. & Nov. 2009 
5 Bell helicopters December 2009 
10 Mobile X-ray minivans December 2009 
Constanza software February 2010 
100 Polygraph units March 2010 
13 armored Suburbans April 2010 
Training  
230 officials attending arms trafficking conferences April to Oct. 2009 
187 Mexican Ministry of Public Safety (SSP) officers trained in 
corrections instruction and classification 
April to Dec. 2009 
United Nation’s human rights project inaugurated July 2009 
4,392 SSP investigators trained Jul. 2009 to Jan. 2010 
USAID training for capacity building programs throughout Mexico for 
over 10,000 Mexican officials in the following areas: 
-Citizen participation councils 
-Victim protection and restitution 
-Judicial exchanges 
-Trafficking in persons 
-Human rights 
-Pre-trial services and case resolution alternatives 
-Continuing education for police, prosecutors and other officials 
-Penal reform 
Aug.2009 to  
Mar. 2010 
Over 200 Mexican prosecutors and investigators trained in trial advocacy, 
trafficking in persons, and extradition 
Sept. 2009  
to Mar. 2010 
28 canine trainers trained Oct. 2009 to Apr. 2010 
293 mid-level and senior-level SSP officers trained Oct. to Nov. 2009 
45 Mexican state officials trained in anti-kidnapping Nov.2009 to Jan. 2010 
Source: GAO Reports, GAO-10–253R and GAO-10–837 
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Table 4.   Bell Helicopter Delivery Timeline118 
Date Action 
June 2008 First Appropriation for $400 million to 
Mexico 
September 2008 First State Spending Plan Approved 
October 2008 First Funds Obligated for Helicopters 
April 2009 Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
Implemented 
June 2009 Helicopter Contract Signed 
December 2009 Estimated Delivery 
Source: GAO Report, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, GAO-10–253R 
As a result of the egregious time-lag in major equipment delivery to Mexican 
agencies, their overall effectiveness in combatting illicit counter-narcotics organizations 
was drastically hampered. As previously stated, 2009 was the first true start of funded 
assets arriving in the field, but what is staggering is that this delay in equipping MI forces 
caused larger secondary effects that impacted readiness. Since forces working under the 
MI did not receive the majority of their equipment and training until after the spring of 
2009, they were still in the process of learning to adjust to that technology and training 
until well into 2010. Thus, personnel working under the umbrella of the MI were unable 
to effectively impact the drug trade until almost three years after the initial approval of 
the plan, approaching the end of the originally intended campaign. 
The second ramification, complementary to the first, is that timeliness of 
implementation depended upon timeliness of delivered assets. Since these assets were 
reliant upon funding that was slow in arriving, portions of the plan came online according 
to resource availability, and the overall organization had to readjust to accommodate the 
new pieces. As a result, this created a crisis of cohesion among units associated with the 
MI. As previously mentioned, new equipment and training requires a break-in period 
during which there can be a decidedly steep learning curve. As new techniques and 
technology are encountered and embraced, reduced proficiency is to be expected, as well 
as unity of effort, as personnel and units re-learn to perform normal tasks. Table 5 
compiles information taken from two GAO reports to Congress and provides a timeline 
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of MI events in Congressional actions and funding.119  It shows that the first 
appropriation for the MI was not completed until June 2008, but funds were not available 
until October of that year. Table 5 also reflects that second and third appropriations and 
delayed letters of agreement with Mexico slowed fourth appropriation of fund approvals 
in U.S. Congress. Additionally, spending plans by the U.S Department of State (DoS) 
were impeded by human rights reports on the behavior of state and national police and 
military personnel in Mexico.  
Table 5.   Mérida Initiative Funding and Documentation Timeline120 
Congressional Actions 
($ in U.S. dollars) 
October 2007 Mérida Initiative Joint Statement Press Release 
June 2008 First Appropriation of Funds 
October 2008 First Funds Available for Obligation 
March 2009 Second Appropriation of Funds 
June 2009 Third Appropriation of Funds 
December 2009 Fourth Appropriation of Funds 
March 2010 $141 million expended; $734 million obligated 
Documentation and Reports to Congress 
September 2008 First State Spending Plan Approved 
December 2008 First Letter of Agreement Signed with Mexico 
April 2009 First Report on Human Rights, Police Transparency, 
and NGO Cooperation for Central 
America 
August 2009 Second and Third State Spending Plans Approved 
August 2009 Second Human Rights Report for Central America 
August 2009 First Human Rights Report for Mexico 
May 2010 Second Letter of Agreement Signed with Mexico 
 Source: GAO Reports, GAO-10–253R and GAO-10–837 
The combination of information from Tables 3 and 5 makes it possible to see how 
legislative delays in coordination between Mexico and the United States greatly 
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attributed to a lag in funding support. Delayed funding from inter-parliamentary setbacks 
staggered the delivery of allocated assets. This ultimately affected the ability of units in 
the field to properly coordinate with one another and with other agencies. Since MI units 
were not equipped with their gear, training, and technology until such a late date, they 
were unable to present a unified front against illegal trafficking. Personnel require time in 
order to adapt to new equipment, not only to adjust their own level of proficiency, but 
also to learn how to move and operate within and across inter-agency lines. The long 
response in funding provision equated to a reduced level of cohesion and unity of effort 
for MI forces. 
Lastly, major corruption issues and the ever-present threat posed by adaptive 
criminal elements resulted in an overall degradation in mission capability. In this 
instance, the specific ability of units to provide timely, cohesive responses to organized 
crime and trafficking organizations was debilitated. One of the stated intents of the MI is 
to “go after the cartels and organized crime and the corruption they generate.”121  As 
such, a major blow was dealt to the Mexican counter-narcotics program when “35 
officials and agents from an elite unit within the federal attorney general’s office [were] 
fired or arrested” 122 in October 2008. This elite unit was Mexico’s Assistant Attorney 
General’s Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime (SIEDO), “in charge of 
probing drug and weapons smuggling as well as kidnapping and terrorism.”123  Arrested 
members included senior intelligence director Fernando Rivera Hernandez and SIEDO’s 
general technical coordinator, Miguel Colorado Gonzalez.124 This incident involved 
“payoffs for sensitive information about antidrug activities” and caused yet another 
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readdressing of policies in vetting counter-narcotics officials.125  Furthermore, it 
provided evidence that infiltration can occur when tactical readiness and unity of effort 
are degraded or completely absent. In addition to a complete reassessment of confirming 
individual loyalties to the counter-narcotics effort, SIEDO, an agency specifically tasked 
with combatting trafficking organizations, faced the problem of replacing key leadership 
positions. The impact of this blow served to show how second-order effects from 
budgetary delays created associational space in which corruptive influences flourished. In 
this instance, with SIEDO facing a leadership restructuring, its mission capability 
essentially reached a standstill until further actions could be taken to ensure personnel 
allegiances. Hence, SIEDO made evident the costs associated to tactical disarray and 
absence of unit cohesion, with linkages to delayed resource provision. 
Why was funding not appropriated and obligated to the MI in a timely manner? 
Essentially, this delay was a result of inadequate oversight by DoS authorities, coupled 
with a lack of measurable milestones and accountability. Three different reports to 
Congress from the GAO stated that organizational factors in resource management 
affected the ability of the DoS to effectively allocate funds to the MI.126  In these reports, 
the GAO shows that a majority of the problems in jumpstarting the MI were rooted in the 
complex manner in which the DoS used multiple accounts for funding, along with a 
nebulous system of checks and balances to provide quality control for the process. 
Additionally, three complementary reports from the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) echoed the above sentiments and concluded that one of the major issues of the MI 
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lay in its lack of funding accountability.127  MI funding is issued from three 
appropriations: the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 
account, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
account.”128 Each account is administered by a separate bureau within the DoS, but 
implementation for certain accounts (INCLE, ESF) is accorded to the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
(respectively), with overall accountability shared among the latter entities and DoS.129  It 
is no wonder that transparency in resource allocation has been cited as subpar, 
considering this wide dispersion of roles and control. 
In summary, delayed funding to the MI caused a reduction in tactical and strategic 
responsiveness for MI forces, impeded unit functionality by undermining cohesion, and 
degraded mission capabilities. The delayed funding was not solely a function of 
availability, but instead a factor of competency, wherein agencies did not effectively 
administer and implement funding obligation and liquidation. The purse strings for the 
campaign were not tightly held, but rather were so loosely drawn that the contents were 
neglected and fell haphazardly, with little or no effective accountability measures. 
Combining these highlighted failures in resource allocation with the type of funding 
allocated for the MI, we can see that the overall shape of the campaign was severely 
slanted toward interdiction and eradication, but without assets to achieve any real 
success. Allocated resources that focused on primarily supply-side tactics changed the 
structure of the MI and essentially oriented its mission (in reality) on direct action efforts, 
while slowly suffocating the plan via resource lag. 
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B. ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRENDS  
1. Comparative Baseline: 2007–2008  
The period between 2007 and 2008 provides a legitimate baseline for comparing 
illicit drug trends in this thesis. Examination of this time frame shows the state of drug 
prices, cultivation, and abuse prior to the real start of the MI and can be used as a 
reference point against which to study the campaign’s impact. The two drugs that 
represent the greatest threat in the global field of illegal drug trafficking are cocaine and 
opiate-based drugs (commonly referred to as heroin), both of which are mainly produced 
in Latin America. It is worth noting that the use of cannabis products and amphetamine-
type stimulants (ATS) has made a significant appearance in the world of illegal narcotics 
and appears to be on the rise. The scope of this thesis will center largely on cocaine, but 
will also devote discussion to the proliferation of the other aforementioned drugs. The 
focus on cocaine in this work is important because this particular substance has had much 
research and as a result provides the greatest wealth of information. It also holds 
significance because of its connection to production in Latin American and consumption 
in the United States. Nevertheless, the other types of drugs must not be ignored, because 
they are inherently intertwined in the drug trade and are useful in displaying trends both 
in the United States and globally. In order to provide a more comprehensive assessment 
of the scope of illegal drug trafficking, a brief overview of the major illegal narcotics 
trends in 2007 and 2008 is required. 
Studies by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) show that 
between 2007 and 2008 the level of coca cultivation in the Andes was quite steady.130  
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru produced an average of 174,600 hectares (ha)—a large 
amount not seen since 2001—despite ongoing U.S. cooperative efforts.131  Additionally, 
the associated quarterly average retail price of cocaine rose steadily from around $100 
dollars per pure gram in the first quarter of 2007 to almost $200 per pure gram by the 
                                                 




final quarter of 2008.132  The monthly street price for pure cocaine sold in the United 
States for this period rose from an average of $122 per pure gram in 2007 to $167 per 
pure gram in 2008, an increase of 36.9 percent.133  Conversely, during the same period, 
annual cocaine purity per gram declined steadily from 65 percent in early 2007 to 
55 percent by the end of 2008.134  The doubling of the cocaine price and ten percent 
reduction in purity in this two-year period is largely reflective of ongoing counter-
narcotics operations already underway by the United States and Latin American nations 
and are not reflective of MI efforts at this juncture. Lastly, to consider the global trends in 
cocaine production and price requires examination of the second largest drug 
consumption market: Europe.135  While monthly averages were not available at the time 
of this writing, yearly averages were obtained from the United Nation’s World Drug 
Report.136  The report shows that annual European retail cocaine prices averaged around 
$198 per pure gram.137  The report also shows that the average purity per gram of retail 
cocaine in Europe averaged 42 percent in 2007 and 2008.138  Lastly, as displayed in 
Tables 6 and 7, consumption of cocaine remained steady between the two years, both in 
the United States and Europe.  
Other illegal narcotic trends in consumption and production varied between North 
America and Europe, depending upon the drug, but consumption remained relatively 
stable in 2007 and 2008, as shown in Table 6. Reasons for comparatively similar rates of 
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consumption across this period can in part be explained by an overall rise in the 
production of certain products, such as opiate crops. These opiate fields grew record 
crops, averaging a cultivated 224,350 ha in this period; quantities not produced since 
2000.139  Two of the major opiate suppliers to North America are Colombia and Mexico, 
which produced some of their largest crops since 2001, averaging 11,505 ha in 
cultivation, and yielding an average of 249 metric tons (mt) of opium between 2007 and 
2008.140  As a result, the total output of heroin into the global market greatly impacted 
the spread of drug sales in both European and U.S. markets. This market flood helps 
explain the relatively stable presence of opiates globally, as shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6.   Annual Prevalent Drug Use in North America and Europe, Age 15–64141  
(Numbers in millions, with percentages) 
 North America Europe 
 2007 2008 2007 2008 




























Source: UNODC World Drug Reports for 2009 and 2010 
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Table 7.   Annual Prevalent Drug Use in the United States, Age 12 and Older142 
(Numbers in thousands, with percentages) 
 2007 2008 
Cocaine 7,189 (2.9%) 
6,364 
(2.5%) 
Opiates 366 (0.1%) 
453 
(0.2%) 
Cannabis 25,085 (10.1%) 
25,768 
(10.3%) 
ATS 1,343 (0.5%) 
850 
(0.3%) 
Source: Results from the 2007 and 2008 U.S. National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
While cocaine and opiates present the greatest threats within the global drug 
market and significance to the scope of this work, cannabis proved to be the most widely 
abused drug in the world during this time.143  Cannabis is relatively easy to grow, indoors 
or outdoors, with very little required to plant it. Despite its preeminence in consumption, 
cannabis has not garnered the same level of attention as cocaine and heroin because it 
causes less public health side effects and also carries far lower retail value than any other 
illicit drug.144  The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) cited Mexico as 
producing roughly 4,000 tons of cannabis in 2007 and 7,400 tons in 2008, most of which 
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was destined to remain in North America.145  Of those tons, the National Survey on  
Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) results show that approximately 25,085 thousand and 
102,404 thousand people in the United States used the substance in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively.146  The relative ease of cultivating cannabis products further increases the 
spread of this substance, which can help explain its steady use in Europe in this period as 
well. 
The amphetamine-type stimulants rounds out the list of high-impact illegal drugs 
in the illicit narcotics industry. Like its contemporaries, ATS abuse has grown alarmingly 
in the new millennium. Production figures are based on estimates, since its combat did 
not start until recently (circa 2007). Nevertheless, abuse statistics reveal that usage of 
amphetamines remained steady in the 2007–08 period, at around 1.3 and 0.5 percent in 
North American and Europe, respectively (Table 6). Table 7 shows that use specifically 
in the United States actually decreased from 2007–2008. A 2008 article reveals that while 
production of ATS increased in Mexico in the years preceding this period, consumption 
curtail began at the end of 2008, as a direct result of precursor chemical bans in 
Mexico.147  Other factors that can explain this sudden reduction include shifts to other 
drugs, as well as adaptive relocation by manufacturers and traffickers. While reduced 
consumption on both sides of the Mexico/U.S. border shows linkages with increased 
measures to prohibit and ban ingredients used in manufacturing ATS, reports show that 
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production and consumption trends were increasing outside of these countries.148  As 
Mexico and the United States enacted tougher precursor controls, chemical production 
shifted into neighboring nations, including Argentina, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru, 
demonstrating the “balloon effect”; the phenomenon whereby crop eradication in one 
nation causes a production increase in another.149  Additionally, Southeast Asian markets 
were burgeoned to fill the vacuum caused by the shift in production, aided by less well-
established precursor laws. Lastly, with regard to Mexico in particular, the growing 
incidence of cocaine provides yet more potential evidence as to the decrease in ATS use. 
During this same time as precursor bans, cocaine and opiate consumption in Mexico 
showed little variation, and in fact grew slightly in the following year.150  The 
combination of better precursor controls, a production vacuum, and available alternative 
drugs at hand in North America directly contributed to shifts in drug trends. 
2. Where Change Should Be Perceptible: 2009–2010  
If the 2008–2009 period represents the baseline for production and consumption, 
then the 2009–2010 period represents the time frame in which change should be 
measurable in this cross-time examination of narcotics trends. If the MI has been 
effective, then the 2009–10 period should display different values than those in the 2007–
08 time frame because the plan’s actions should have created a discernible impact on the 
global and U.S. markets. Table 8 represents the average annual retail street price of 
cocaine and opiates in the United States and Europe during the four-year period. As 
previously stated, this work retains a focus on the United States and Europe because they 
represent the two largest global consumption markets. As such, an examination of their 
respective price trends should yield viable results in estimating any significant changes in 
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price between 2007 and 2010. From Table 8 we can see that the only sector to show a 
decrease from 2007 to 2010 was that of opiate price in Europe, dropping 9 percent from 
its annual average in four years. Otherwise, the retail trends in the other three sectors 
reveal that cocaine increased in price in both markets, including the United States. 
Cocaine and opiates displayed different trends in retail price during this time 
frame, wherein cocaine retail price rose 39 percent in the United States and 51 percent in 
Europe from 2007 to 2010, while opiate price grew 26 percent in the former but declined 
by 9 percent in the latter (Table 8). These retail price trends do not display similar 
patterns to usage (Tables 9 and 10), such as prices dropping in the 2008–2009 period. It is 
worth noting that lowered opiate prices in Europe in 2010 did correlate with slight 
decreases in opiate consumption for that year. This data, when compared with our first 
hypothesis, allows us to examine if the MI has been effective. The first hypothesis states 
that if MI actions have been effective, we should see a marked increase in the price of 
illegal narcotics. From the data previously discussed in Table 8, we know that cocaine 
prices steadily increased in both Europe and the United States during this period. Opiate 
prices declined in Europe, which could be in part explained by the surplus remnants of 
opiate crops that flooded the market with record cultivation from 2007 to 2009.151  If we 
consider cocaine only, then it would appear the MI has been partially effective, based on 
our supply-side expectations. Yet, the MI had no evident effect on opiate prices, 
especially if one focuses on the European market. Since these two areas represent the 
largest consumption markets in the world, and therefore hold significance in assessing 
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Table 8.   Average Annual Retail Street Price of Cocaine and Opiates  
(Per Pure Gram), 2007 through 2010 (Amounts in U.S. Dollars) 
 
 United States Europe 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cocaine $122 $167 $186 $169 $161 $235 $217 $243 
Opiates $356 $361 $385 $450 $232 $246 $230 $211 
Source: UNODC World Drug Reports for 2008–2012 
Table 9 represents aggregate data for the annual prevalent drug use in North 
America and Europe, from 2007 through 2010. In North America overall illicit drug use 
exhibited some fluctuation with respect to cocaine (noticeable decline) and cannabis 
(slight increase), but averages remained steady in ATS and opiate use. Meanwhile, 
consumption averages across all four categories remained relatively stable in Europe, 
with only a minor decrease in opiate usage from 2007 to 2010. Comparing the two 
periods, there is a minor reduction in cocaine, cannabis, and ATS use in North America 
between 2008 and 2009, a critical juncture at which MI effectiveness should be 
discernible. However, aside from cocaine use in North America, this slight deviation does 
not appear with any lasting significance elsewhere in the four-year span. Specific data for 
the United States provides a supporting narrative, in which cannabis and cocaine use 
displayed similar North American levels between 2007–08 and 2009–10, increasing and 
declining, respectively (Table 10). Opiate consumption in the United States shows a 
marginal increase in the first two years, but remains steady thereafter. Only cocaine 
consumption appears to have been negatively affected across this period, as relative 
stability or marginal increase are visible in the other drugs. Considering this period in 
two-part comparison and in total, there is little impact reduction to three of the four major 
drug areas discussed herein.  
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This analysis allows us to consider the second hypothesis, distinct from and yet 
still connected with the first, in that price and usage should share an inverse relationship, 
in line with supply-side theory. We know that in the largess, the MI has proven itself 
relatively effective at impacting drug prices, as discussed above. But, based on 
hypothesis two, if MI actions were successful, then a reduction in illicit narcotics 
consumption should be visible both domestically in the U.S. market and globally. The 
data listed in Tables 9 and 10 shows that overall consumption varied by area and by drug 
type. Europe displays relatively stable levels of consumption for the four drug types, with 
only a slight decrease in opiate consumption. As discussed above, North America and the 
United States display similar trends, in which only cocaine showed noticeable reduction, 
while cannabis, opiates, and ATS showed stability or increase. In accordance with the 
second hypothesis, this stability in three of the four major drug types should not exist. 
Additionally, the relative stability in Europe across all four years lends further weight 
against the predicted outcome. Hence, we must conclude that the MI was ineffective in 
reducing overall drug consumption, because usage was not generally decreased. Some 
level of credit could plausibly be given to the MI, because of the decreased instance of 
cocaine use, but this impact is most likely explained by the continued presence of 
counter-narcotics campaigns that pre-date this particular plan. 
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Table 9.   Annual Prevalent Drug Use in North America and Europe, Age 15–64152  
(Numbers in millions, with percentages) 
 
 North America Europe 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 




























































 Source: UNODC World Drug Reports for 2009–2012 
 
                                                 
152 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2009. New York: United Nations, 2010; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World 
Drug Report 2010. New York: United Nations Pub., 2011. 
 56
Table 10.   Annual Prevalent Drug Use in the United States, Age 12 and Older153  
(Numbers in thousands, with percentages) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 




























Source: Results from the U.S. National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), 2007–2010 
We cannot discuss our last meter for supply-side effectiveness without a brief 
discussion of product cultivation and production for the two drugs that pose the most 
danger to counter-narcotics: cocaine and opiates. According to the World Drug Report 
2012, coca production declined between the 2007 and 2010. The annual total of coca 
produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru decreased from 181,600ha in 2007, to 
149,200ha in 2010, a loss of 18 percent.154  In comparing the two periods, the decline 
was 12 percent between 2007–08 (average of 174,600ha) and 2009–10 (average of 
154,000ha).155  This trend is correlated with decreased use in the United States and North 
America, as the total supply in the market declined. Conversely, opiate production grew 
during the four-year period, as the total output of crops in Colombia and Mexico were 
                                                 
153 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. “Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed 
Tables.” Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research Distributor, accessed 
February 7, 2013, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10ResultsTables/NSDUHTables2007R/HTM/TOC.htm; 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Office of Applied Studies. “Results from the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed 
Tables.” Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research Distributor, accessed 
February 7, 2013, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10ResultsTables/NSDUHTables2008R/HTM/TOC.htm. 
154 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2012. New York: United Nations, 2012, 35. 
155 Ibid., 35. 
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estimated at 54,053 ha, a 135% increase from 2007 to 2010.156  Considering the two time 
frames, opiate production in Colombia and Mexico increased by 48 percent between 
2007–08 and 2009–10.157  When taken as a whole, we see a decrease in coca cultivation, 
but a surge in opiate growth between 2007 and 2010. 
Estimates for cocaine purity in the United States vary somewhat between U.S. 
government statistics and those provided by the United Nations, but the overall picture is 
similar; namely, that while purity has declined since 2007, it has remained relatively 
stable through 2010. Specifically, the World Drug Report cites a purity of 85 percent for 
U.S. cocaine purity in 2007 and claims a steady decline to 73 percent in 2010.158  In 
comparison, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) reports the 2007 purity of cocaine at 
almost 70 percent, declining to 47 percent by 2010 (Figure 1). Likewise, a report by the 
National Forensics Laboratory Information System (NFLIS), an entity utilized by the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) chemical analysis, shows similar findings in 
Texas (Figure 2). The use of Texas serves as a crucial case due to its close proximity to 
drug trafficking pipelines from Latin America. As such, drug seizures made in that state 
hold relevance in assessing the purity of illegal narcotics entering the U.S. consumption 
market. Both figures coincide; the purity of cocaine within the United States has shown a 
notable decline since 2007, but has maintained relative stability in the following three 
years. 
                                                 
156 Ibid., 27. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., 36. 
 58
 
Source: U.S. National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, reproduced with permission granted by U.S. DoJ 
Figure 1.  Cocaine Price and Purity in the United States, 2007–2010159 
 
                                                 




Source: reproduced from the National Forensics Laboratory Information Systems 2011 Annual Report, 
with permission granted by NFLIS 
Figure 2.  Cocaine Purity, 2002–2011, Texas160 
Opiate purity was difficult to determine from reputable sources because while its 
consumption and trafficking garner major attention in the United States, its level of purity 
does not. As such, we can still obtain a reasonable estimate of opiate purity by comparing 
state-level analysis in Texas and European market statistics. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, 
opiate purity displayed similar trends with cocaine between 2007 and 2010, with a 
definite downturn after the first year of our time frame. Likewise, it also shows a 
relatively stable path thereafter through the end of the period in question. From these 
figures, we can see that both of these illegal narcotics peaked in purity in 2007, but 
declined thereafter and remained relatively stable across our time frames. Based on this 
information, we may now review our final hypothesis. 
                                                 
160 United States National Forensics Laboratory. National Forensic Laboratory Information System 2011 Annual 
Report: U.S. Dept. of Justice Enforcement Administration Office of Diversion Control, 2011, 22. 
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Source: reproduced from the World Drug Report 2012, with permission granted by UNODC 
Figure 3.   Opiate Prices and Purity in Europe, 2003–2010161 
 
                                                 
161 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2012. New York: United Nations, 2012, 34. 
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Source: reproduced from the National Forensics Laboratory Information Systems 2011 Annual Report, 
with permission granted by NFLIS 
Figure 4.   Opiate Purity, 2002–2011, Texas162 
Hypothesis three provides a counter-perspective to the former hypotheses, 
positing that if MI actions have been ineffective, then we should see no evident changes 
in drug prices and usage, or a decrease in both, as well as stable or increased illegal drug 
purity. This follows the form of previously highlighted supply-side edict: that supply 
reduction, greater interdiction, and stiffer penalties for drug use will decrease their 
prevalence among users, by applying the alternate outcome, in which the dependent 
variables (use and price) are negatively affected. So, in order for this hypothesis to be 
true, the information and research should show that drug prices did not increase and 
consumption and purity did not decrease. Based on the information discussed previously 
in this chapter, we already know that, indeed, illegal narcotic price rose rather 
dramatically between 2007–08 and 2009–10. Therefore, this hypothesis is already in 
jeopardy because the first requirement (price stability or reduction) has not been met. In 
considering illegal narcotic consumption, the data reveals a noticeable stability in usage 
of the four major drug areas in Europe the United States, with the exception of cocaine. 
                                                 
162 United States National Forensics Laboratory. National Forensic Laboratory Information System 2011 Annual 
Report: U.S. Dept. of Justice Enforcement Administration Office of Diversion Control, 2011, 22. 
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So in this instance, the MI at best could only be given claim to partial credit for impacting 
illegal drug trafficking. It is apparent that overall stable consumption stands as a sign of 
ineffectiveness, and in that aspect, this hypothesis is proven true. Lastly, the purity of 
both cocaine and opiates peaked in 2007, but declined thereafter and maintained a fairly 
stable position throughout the next three years. Comparing the two periods, it appears 
that the MI provided no real contribution to impacting the purity of these two substances, 
as there is no real shift in trends between 2007–08 and 2009–10. If the MI were truly 
ineffective, then prices would have remained stable or shrunk. Since that was obviously 
not the case, then this hypothesis cannot achieve all the criteria. Hence, we must conclude 
that the results for this hypothesis are inconclusive, due to the rise in prices.  
C. SUMMARY REMARKS 
In this chapter, I have discussed the overall implementation of the MI. I have 
examined how funding appropriation was afforded to the plan, and how those resources 
were directed to components within the overall structure. Likewise, I have seen how the 
focus of funding on supply-side areas, like interdiction and eradication, slanted the 
ultimate efforts of the campaign toward that approach and detracted from soft-side items 
like infrastructure. Furthermore, the implications of timeliness were discussed, including 
the impact of delayed funding on the total effectiveness of the MI. Additionally, I have 
delved into the anti-narcotics history between Colombia and the United States, showing 
how that relationship served not only as a blueprint for the MI, but also provided lessons 
learned that influenced its shape. That shape was proven to be more hypothetical than 
real, as funding and focus shifted away from the humanitarian and societal aspects and 
toward direct action elements. Lastly, in this chapter I discussed the overall results 
regarding impact of the MI on drug price, consumption, and purity. In this instance, only 
one hypothesis was proven true: prices increased on the whole, between the two periods. 
The other two hypotheses were proven wrong (no broad consumption decrease) or 
inconclusive. The next section will provide concluding remarks and brief 
recommendations for the way ahead. 
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IV. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, WAY FORWARD 
A. CONCLUSION 
Funding and resources for counter-narcotics programs in Latin America have 
grown at an alarming rate in the forty years that the war on drugs has been waged. 
Likewise, the amount of global attention garnered to this topic has skyrocketed, as the 
expansion of consumption markets made illegal narcotics trafficking a very lucrative 
field of entrepreneurship. As a result of larger consumption markets and drug-trade 
expansion, the United States has taken an ever-increasing interest in the major narcotic 
production and trafficking areas in nearby Latin America. In the new millennium, the 
United States has continued to dedicate massive amounts of funds and resources to stem 
the tide of illegal narcotics entering its borders. These efforts have largely been centered 
on supply-side (SS) strategies, wherein the goal is to reduce the demand by curtailing the 
drug supply and imposing a high cost to traffickers and users.163 Such programs have 
been carried out in Bolivia, Colombia, the Caribbean, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, with 
varying results. Of these nations, Mexico has received a significant portion of U.S. 
attention and funding in response to the perceived threat posed by illicit narcotics 
trafficking. The United States and Mexico have shown a collective resolve to address the 
issues yielded by the illegal drug trade, allocating almost $2 billion to the campaign 
between 2007 and 2010 via the Mérida Initiative (MI).164 In contrast, the levels of global 
consumption and production have been largely unaffected.165 The continued vitality of 
the drug enterprise presents an interesting puzzle, considering the ever-increasing amount 
of funding and resources aligned against it. Since Mexico is one of the global leaders in 
drug production and the United States is the largest consumption market, how is it that 
such an illicit industry continues to thrive, despite the apparent best attempts by these two 
                                                 
163 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin. “The U.S. ‘War on Drugs’: Its Impact in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, 1–13. Boulder: L. Rienner, 2005. 
164 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central 
America: Funding and Policy Issues, by Clare R. Seelke, CRS Report RL12345 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, August 21, 2010), 8. 
165 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2009. New York: United Nations Pub., 2010; 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2010. New York: United Nations Pub., 2011. 
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resource-rich nations? By highlighting the MI, this thesis has strived to address this 
puzzle and answer the question of the plan’s effectiveness at increasing prices and 
reducing consumption. 
The first chapter discussed U.S. intervention in Latin America regarding anti-drug 
operations, and addressed the aforementioned puzzle presented by the dichotomous 
nature of drugs and counter-narcotics campaigns. Chapter I also discussed the proposed 
method of analysis employed in this work, as well as associated problems and 
hypotheses. In particular, the expected hypotheses included a focus on drug prices, 
consumption, and purity. This chapter also provided a literature review of prominent 
academic and institutional work concerning this topic, examining supporter and opponent 
opinions regarding counter-narcotics programs in the field. Lastly, Chapter I presented a 
framework for this thesis in order to show the overall progression of this examination; 
first discussing the historical background of counter-narcotics policies enacted in Latin 
America, and then working through the creation of the most recent plan, the MI, ending 
in an examination of its implementation. 
The second chapter provided an in-depth review of the historical background of 
the MI, beginning with Plan Colombia and the experiences of the United States in 
combatting drug trafficking in Colombia and the Andean Region. This chapter discussed 
the impact of Plan Colombia on U.S.-led counter-drug campaigns, which ultimately 
helped shape the MI. Particular scrutiny was given to how lessons learned during Plan 
Colombia greatly influenced the decisions of U.S. legislature in shaping the MI, to ensure 
a more comprehensive course of action. The chapter further discussed how the impact of 
the September 2001 terrorist attacks influenced the MI by providing a security 
framework, in which efforts to halt organized crime were indeed framed as part of the 
“new anti-terrorist” strategy. Direct attention was paid to Congressional hearings and 
discussion concerning the MI, in which counter-narcotics policies were directly and 
explicitly linked to counterterrorism efforts. 
This chapter revealed that a wounded United States, reeling from the terrorist 
attacks, was extremely eager to respond quickly and effectively to its attackers. However, 
in the course of responding to terrorism, Washington began to apply similarly high levels 
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of funding and resources to other security issue-areas, such as counter-narcotics. 
Ultimately, the U.S. urgency for action eventually slanted funding for the MI, favoring 
typical SS methods, like interdiction and eradication. Similarly, Chapter II discussed how 
Mexico has faced an heightened public security threat posed by organized crime, which 
was evident by the proliferation of drug cartels across its northern border and increased 
(if not unprecedented) levels of drug-related violence. Chapter II discussed how the 
combination of U.S. and Mexican security concerns eventually coincided, leading to a 
common response in the form of a SS program, which resembled the one implemented in 
Colombia. Chapter II also examined how Mexican imperatives and policy preferences 
affected the final constitution of the MI, leading to its formal approval in 2007. Finally, 
the chapter provided an overview of the MI’s final structure, including its four pillars and 
the associated underpinnings for interdiction, eradication, and judiciary infrastructure 
reform. In sum, despite the effort of both nations to provide a comprehensive response to 
drug trafficking, the focus of initial funding appropriations, combined with heightened 
U.S. insecurity and Mexican sovereignty concerns, skewed the end result of the plan back 
toward a historically SS based strategy. 
Chapter III focused its attention on the implementation of the MI, including the 
impact of funding, as well as the campaign’s effectiveness in affecting drug trends. The 
chapter demonstrated that funding delays undermined effectiveness in three ways: (1) it 
reduced the capability of agencies to bring complete forces to bear in the campaign, (2) it 
fostered piecemeal and staggered activation of forces and, (3) it eroded cohesion and 
unity by exposing Mexican forces to further deterioration and corruption from drug 
trafficking organizations.  
Chapter III also analyzed the plan’s effectiveness in impacting drug trends by 
comparing relevant data in consumption, price, and purity from 2007 to 2010. Special 
attention was placed on the analysis of data regarding cocaine and opiates, as these are 
the two drugs that posed the greatest influence in the global narcotics market. Data from 
official sources indicated that prices for cocaine in global markets increased between 
2007 and 2010, while opiate prices fell only in Europe, explained in part by the surplus 
remnants of opiate crops that flooded the market with record cultivation from 2007 to 
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2009.166 This would indicate that our first hypothesis, regarding MI effectiveness in 
increasing drug prices, was confirmed. On the other hand, the data on drug consumption 
indicated that cocaine use declined in both North America and the United States, between 
2007 and 2010. In contrast, opiate use remained steady for both areas during this time 
frame. Additionally, European markets showed relative stability for both substances 
across the four-year period. This suggests that hypothesis two, evaluating cocaine and 
opiate consumption, was not confirmed, since the data revealed no significant broad 
decrease in usage. Finally, the evidence on price, consumption, and purity suggests that 
hypothesis three, concerning MI ineffectiveness, was inconclusive. This hypothesis 
considered a counter-perspective from the first two, in which MI ineffectiveness would 
be proven by the existence of stable or decreased prices, and stable or increased 
consumption and purity. Higher cocaine prices combined with steady consumption and 
purity did not provide this work with grounds to confirm this hypothesis; ultimately, only 
one of the three hypotheses was confirmed. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS, WAY FORWARD 
Given what we know about the MI and its impact thus far, we can see that it was 
not largely effective at reducing the global level of illegal narcotics consumption via SS 
means, despite dedicating such vast resources and funding to the effort. As such, this 
author recommends that U.S. and Mexican legislature consider shifting their focus 
toward demand reduction efforts in place of largely SS strategies. In doing so, they 
should give attention to decriminalizing illegal narcotics consumption and work to 
address associated societal issues. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine 
all alternatives, we can still give brief mention to some prominent counter-perspectives 
and highlight relevant associated literature. One notable source, the Global Commission 
on Drug Policy (GCDP), shared this author’s sentiment in a 2011 report speaking to this 
issue.167 The GCDP, whose commission includes three former Latin American presidents 
                                                 
166 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2011. New York: United Nations Pub., 2011, 
60. 
167 War on Drugs Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Global Commission 
on Drugs, 2011. 
 67
and several former senior UN and U.S. representatives, agreed that the fascination with 
SS methods must be abandoned in favor of less invasive tactics, since the former policies 
have largely failed. In the report, they call for a complete restructuring of counter-drug 
efforts, urging world leaders to: 
Begin the transformation of the global drug prohibition regime. Replace 
drug policies and strategies driven by ideology and political convenience 
with fiscally responsible policies and strategies grounded in science, 
health, security and human rights – and adopt appropriate criteria for their 
evaluation.168  
This report highlights demand-side focus areas, citing three European case studies 
that utilized demand and harm reduction to significantly impact consumption and 
associated crime and health costs. The report shows that in the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland, the decriminalization of drug use and provision of treatment 
(and in some cases legal substitution) by the respective governments yielded great 
success in reducing overall consumption, in particular for first time and repeat users.169 
Additionally, this report calls for the international community to remove the taboo of 
debating drug policy reform and allow for new avenues to be paved to consider 
approaches to this topic that do not rely solely on direct action tactics like interdiction 
and eradication. 
Other reports and testimony echo portions of this sentiment, agreeing that current 
counter-narcotics policies are failing to win the war on drugs and new measures should 
be undertaken. In particular, a 2011 report by Peter Hakim, president emeritus and senior 
fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, suggests six initiatives to reform U.S. counter-
narcotics policy.170 Hakim recommends increased legislative support to establish a 
commission to review current U.S. anti-drug policies and provide “alternate domestic and 
international approaches”171 to counter-narcotics. He urges the United States to work 
                                                 
168 Ibid., 3. 
169 Ibid., 7. 
170 Peter Hakim, Inter-American Dialogue (Organization), and Beckley Foundation., Rethinking U.S. Drug 
Policy. Oxford, England: Beckley Foundation, 2011. 
171 Ibid., 3. 
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purposefully with Latin American nations to substantially increase cooperation in 
addressing counter-narcotics, including intelligence collection and sharing. Hakim also 
recommends that U.S. legislature allocate funding to study economic, health, and social 
facets of drug consumption, and make the findings available for international review. 
Lastly, his report calls for “drug programs and initiatives at the community, state, and 
federal levels that promise real benefits in… reducing drug addiction and the health risks 
of addicts, increasing ... rehabilitation and decreasing drug related crimes.”172 Each 
initiative has its own respective focus, but their collective goal is to affect a more 
comprehensive revision of all current U.S. drug policies and a broader expansion of 
discourse into the international arena, since the drug trade is a global epidemic. 173  
Likewise, a 2009 report by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Policy 
cites the rising violence associated with drug trafficking as another significant reason to 
review current counter-drug policies.174 The Commission argues that the United States 
should assess the successes and pitfalls of current campaigns and readjust future policies 
to include demand-side elements. The Commission does not seek to disregard past 
policies, but favors a new approach that provides a truly comprehensive response to 
illegal narcotics. Looking to the future, the Commission states that: “The way forward 
lies in acknowledging the insufficient results of current policies and, without dismissing 
the immense efforts undertaken, launching a broad debate about alternative strategies.”175 
From this hearing, it is apparent that debate for alternate policies continues to encounter 
resistance in Congress, but the other hearings reveal that acceptance of this discussion is 
on the rise. Congressional testimony in 2010 to the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, 
shows that even the United States has contributed dialogue to policy reform, albeit 
sparingly.176 These Congressional hearings show that the steady increase of drug-related 
                                                 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid., 3. 
174 Latin American Commission on Drugs and Policy. Drugs and Democracy: Toward a Paradigm Shift: Latin 
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, 2009. 
175 Ibid., 6. 
176 United States Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Quitting Hard Habits: 
Efforts to Expand and Improve Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug-Involved Offenders. 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 
2011. 
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incarceration since 1980 has placed a great fiscal burden on U.S. state penal systems 
across the nation, forcing legislators to consider alternate policies.177 The convening of 
this hearing was significant because it was “the first congressional hearing to consider in 
a comparative perspective the various efforts within the criminal justice system itself to 
avoid incarceration and to provide drug treatment.”178 The hearing provides discussion of 
several state-level programs that provide alternative sentencing and treatment for non-
violent and first-time offenders. The testimony shows that reducing strict penalties for 
this type of offender could greatly alleviate judicial and penal funding requirements, 
which could be used in implementing alternative plans. The overall theme of these 
hearings is clear: SS tactics should be reevaluated immediately. 
Preliminary results from the research data suggest that SS programs are 
ineffective, at least in the short-term. If SS programs are apparently insufficient to the 
task of impacting illegal narcotics, perhaps the United States should consider demand-
side programs instead. From this perspective, anti-drug consumption policies should be 
reviewed, including decriminalization of use and a focus on health-related programs for 
addicts. Studies suggesting the way forward in the United States already exist, with 
particular attention to demand-side factors, including one notable report by the GCDP in 
2011. The report shows that demand-side methods like drug dependence treatment have a 
solid return on resources invested, as evidenced in Zurich, Switzerland, where such 
programs reduced consumption by 4 percent each year, from 1990 to 2002.179 
Additionally, the study showed that “other benefits observed included reductions in: HIV 
infections; drug overdose deaths; crime and the quantity of heroin seized in the city.”180 
A similar article by Mark Klieman examines the failure of current SS procedures, 
presenting supportive information for alternative programs that have highly successful 
                                                 
177 Ibid., 2. 
178 Ibid. 
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180 Alek Wodak, Demand Reduction and Harm Reduction: Working Paper for the First Meeting of the Global 
Commission on Drug Policies, Geneva, Switzerland: Global Commission on Drug Policies, 2011, 4. 
 70
records.181 Kleiman supports alternate methods including less severe penalties for 
consumption and targeted police action for violent drug dealers. Among these programs, 
he lists the Hawaiian HOPE program, citing its ability to provide less-severe punishments 
for repeat offenders, including limited jail time and frequent urinalysis. He shows that the 
80 percent success rate of such programs not only gets long-term ATS users to quit, but 
also gets them “out of confinement in less than one year.”182 This method stems from the 
idea that less-expensive, less-punitive actions lead to a greater instance of their 
implementation. Essentially, less-punitive actions are more cost-effective and since they 
are likelier to be utilized, they provide a higher level of success. The existence of such 
scholarly research into the field of alternate methods provides hope that such methods 
can be successfully utilized, with benefits to social health, crime, and reduced funding. 
In summary, the arguable success of SS strategies thus far provides enough 
evidence to feasibly consider reviewing current policy and incorporating a wider array of 
tactics, including treatment and decriminalization. The way forward requires a critical 
examination of interdiction and eradication policies. For too long the U.S. has pursued SS 
policies that often yield unintended consequences or simply fail to accomplish its stated 
goals. As argued by Coletta Youngers, “reducing supply will make the illicit drug trade 
more dangerous and costly. This in turn is assumed to drive down production, drive up 
prices, and ultimately discourage… citizens from buying and using illicit drugs.”183 If 
current SS policies are continued, then we must recommend more time for researchers to 
examine this topic. Over a decade passed before the effects and consequences were 
clearly visible and this may be the same for the MI. Additionally, increased time to 
examine this topic will yield greater, more reliable results as to the long-term effects of 
the MI in affecting price and consumption, as this policy is adjusted in future revisions. 
This will provide a greater scope as to the lasting, if any, positive effects of this 
campaign. 
                                                 
181 Mark A. Kleiman, “Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars : Smarter Policies for both Sides of the Border.” In 
Foreign Affairs Vol. 90, no. 5, p, 2011. 
182 Ibid., 4. 
183 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “The U.S. ‘War on Drugs’: Its Impact in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, Boulder: L. Rienner, 2005. 
 71
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abbott, Philip K. “The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?” The Small 
Wars Journal 7, no. 1 (2011): 1–10.  
Abu-Hamdeh, Sabrina. “The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence 
in Mexico?” Pepperdine Policy Review 4, no. 1 (2011): 5.  
 “Administation Officials Announce U.S.-Mexico Border Security Policy: A 
Comprehensive Response and Commitment.” White House Office of the Press 




Babor, Thoma, Jonathan Caulkins, and Griffith Edwards. Drug Policy and the Public 
Good. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press : Pan American Health 
Organization, 2010.  
Barry, Tom. Aiding Insecurity: Four Years of Mexico’s Drug War and Merida Initiative: 
Center for International Policy (CIP), 2011.  
“BBC News - Q&A: Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence,” accessed 10/25/2012, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10681249.  
Beittel, June S., Library of Congress and Congressional Research Service. “Colombia 
Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf;  
———. “Mexico’s Drug-Related Violence.” Congressional Research Service, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40582.pdf.  
Bertram, Eva. Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/bios/ucal051/95019168.html. 
Border Security and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2005.  
Brewer, Stephanie E. “Rethinking the Merida Initiative: Why the U.S. must Change 





Brouwer, Kimberly C., Patricia Case, Rebeca Ramos, Carlos Magis-Rodríguez, Jesus 
Bucardo, Thomas L. Patterson, and Steffanie A. Strathdee. “Trends in Production, 
Trafficking, and Consumption of Methamphetamine and Cocaine in Mexico.” 
Substance use & Misuse 41, no. 5 (05, 2006): 707–727. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cja&AN=20426845&site
=ehost-live&scope=site.  
Calderon, Felipe. “President Bush and President Calderón Participate in a Joint Press 
Availability.” White House Office of the Press Secretary, accessed FEB 27, 2012, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070314–
2.html.  
Campbell, David R. “Evaluating the Impact of Drug Trafficking Organizations on the 
Stability of the Mexican State.” Fort Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College.  
Caulkins, Jonathan P., and Rand Corporation. How Goes the “War on Drugs”? an 
Assessment of U.S. Drug Programs and Policy. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 
2005.  
Chiesa, James, Susan S. Everingham, Jonathan P. Caulkins, and RAND CORP SANTA 
MONICA CA. “Response to the National Research Council’s Assessment of 
RAND’s Controlling Cocaine Study.” Defense Technical Information Center.  
Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. Assessing the Merida Initiative: 
A Report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Serial no. 111–109. 
2nd sess., 2010.  
Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. Central America and the 
Merida Initiative. 2nd sess., 2008.  
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Has Mérida Evolved? Joint Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and the Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session. 112th Cong., 1st 
sess., 2011.  
Committee on Homeland Security. The Mérida Initiative : Examining United States 
Efforts to Combat Transnational Criminal Organizations. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 
June 5, 2008.  
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. A Review of the 
President’s Certification Program for Narcotics-Reducing and Transit Countries 
in Latin America. 104th Cong., 2nd sess., March 7, 1996.  
 73
Committee on the Judiciary. Protecting the Homeland: The President’s Proposal for 
Reorganizing our Homeland Security Infrastructure. 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 
June,25, 2002.  
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. 
International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply of 
Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives. 2010.  
Congressional Budget Office. Andean Initiative: Objectives and Support. Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 1994.  
Cook, Colleen W., and Claire. R. Seelke. Merida Initiative: Proposed U.S. Anticrime and 
Counterdrug Assistance for Mexico and Central America: U.S. Library of 
Congress Congressional Research Service, 2008.  
Cook, Colleen W., and Library of Congress. “Mexico’s Drug Cartels.” Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress.  
Corchado, Alfredo. “A Fighting Chance.” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 33, no. 2 
(Spring, 2009): pp. 18–23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40262509.  
Crandall, Russell. The United States and Latin America After the Cold War. Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.  
Cunningham, James K., Ietza Bojorquez, Octavio Campollo, Lon-Mu Liu, and Jane 
Carlisle Maxwell. “Mexico’s Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical 
Interventions: Impacts on Drug Treatment Admissions.” Addiction 105, no. 11 
(11, 2010): 1973–1983. doi:10.1111/j.1360–0443.2010.03068.x. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=54287117&site
=ehost-live&scope=site.  
Customs Border Security Act of 2001: United States Government Printing Office, 2002.  
Delle Donne, Maria, and Laura Starr. “Does the Merida Initiative Represent a New 
Direction for U.S.-Mexico Relations, Or does it Simply Refocus the Issue 
Elsewhere?” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), accessed FEB/25, 2012, 
http://www.coha.org/does-the-merida-initiative-represent-a-new-direction-for-us-
mexico-relations-or-does-it-simply-refocus-the-issue-elsewhere/.  
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107–173, 
(2002): 116 stat. 543.  




Ford, Jess T., United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and United States Government 
Accountability Office. “Mérida Initiative the United States Needs Better 
Performance Measures for its Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support Efforts: 
Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office.  
Ford, Jess T., United States, Congress, House, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, United States and Government 
Accountability Office. “Drug Control: International Programs Face Significant 
Challenges Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign 
Policy Objectives: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.” 
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo9916 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10921t.pdf.  
Ford, Jess T., United States, and Government Accountability Office. “Status of Funds for 
the Mérida Initiative.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-10–253R.  
Frechette, Myles R. Colombia and the United States - the Partnership: But what is the 
Endgame?. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2007.  
“From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and 
Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America. Implications for Global 
Security.”  
FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 110–252, 122 Stat. 2323 (JUNE 
30, 2008): 1409.  
Hakim, Peter, and Kimberly Covington. What is U.S. Drug Policy?: Inter-American 
Dialogue (Organization), 2012.  
Hakim, Peter, Inter-American Dialogue (Organization), and Beckley Foundation. 
Rethinking U.S. Drug Policy. Oxford, England: Beckley Foundation, 2011.  
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, (2002): 116 stat. 2135.  
Hurrell, Andrew. “Security in Latin America.” International Affairs 74, no. 3 (1998): 
529–546.  
Iliff, Laurence. “MEXICO - U.S. Conditions Threaten Anti-Drug Initiative - Congress 
Seeks Legal, Human Rights Reforms; Border Partner Says it’s Return of 
‘Certification’.” Dallas Morning News, the (TX), 2008.  
 75
“In Essence.” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 33, no. 3 (Summer, 2009): pp. 67–88. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40261865.  
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). “Report of the International Narcotics 
Control Board for 2007.” The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report.html.  
———. “Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2008.” The 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report.html.  
———. “Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2009.” The 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report.html.  
———. “Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2010.” The 
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), 
http://www.incb.org/incb/en/publications/annual-reports/annual-report.html.  
Isacson, Adam, Joy Olson, Latin American Working Group (Toronto,Ont.), and Center 
for International Policy (Washington,D.C.). Just the Facts: A Civilian’s Guide to 
U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
[Washington, DC]: Latin America Working Group, 1999.  
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress. U.S. Drug Policy: At what Cost? 
Moving Beyond the Self-Defeating Supply-Control Fixation. 2008.  
 “Joint U.S.-Mexico Communiqué.” White House Office of the Press Secretary. press 
release, March 14, 2007, accessed 03/12, 2013, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/03/print/20070314–4.html.  
Kellner, Tomas, and Francesco Pipitone. “Inside Mexico’s Drug War.” World Policy 
Journal 27, no. 1 (Spring, 2010): pp. 29–37. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27870316.  
Kleiman, Mark A. R. “Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars : Smarter Policies for both Sides 
of the Border.” In Foreign Affairs Vol. 90, no. 5, p, 2011.  
Kyle, Margaret. “Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade.” Bejeap the B.E.Journal of 
Economic Analysis & Policy 11, no. 2 (2011).  
Latin American Commission on Drugs and Policy. Drugs and Democracy: Toward a 
Paradigm Shift: Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, 2009.  
Latin American Working Group. Going to Extremes: The U.S.-Funded Aerial 
Eradication Program in Colombia. Washington, DC: Latin America Working 
Group, 2004.  
 76
Latin American Working Group (Toronto,Ont.) and Center for International Policy 
(Washington,D.C.). “Just the Facts : A Civilian’s Guide to U.S. Defense and 
Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean.” Just the Facts : A 
Civilian’s Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and 
the Caribbean (1998).  
Lemus, Maria C. R., Kimberly Stanton, and John Walsh. “Colombia: A Vicious Circle of 
Drugs and War.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. 
Policy, edited by Youngers, Coletta and Eileen Rosin, 99–142. Boulder, Colo.: L. 
Rienner, 2005. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0419/2004014978.html.  
Lund, Joshua. “The Poetics of Paramilitarism.” Revista Hispánica Moderna 64, no. 1 
(June, 2011): pp. 61–67. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41306062.  
Manwaring, Max G., and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. “A 
Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty Gangs and Other Illicit 
Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Jamaica, and Brazil.” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.  
Mercille, Julien. “Violent Narco-Cartels Or U.S. Hegemony? the Political Economy of 
the ‘war on Drugs’ in Mexico.” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 9 (10/01; 2012/08, 
2011): 1637–1653. doi:10.1080/01436597.2011.619881. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.619881.  
“Merida Initiative: Success/Accomplishments (Taken Question) “ , accessed 10/25/2012, 
2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/09/172574.htm.  
Michel, Kenneth and Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. Mexico and the Cocaine 
Epidemic: The New Colombia Or a New Problem. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical 
Information Center, 2010.  
Mottier, Nicole. “Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez: 1928–1936.” Mexican 
Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 25, no. 1 (Winter, 2009): pp. 19–46. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/msem.2009.25.1.19.  
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109–163, 119 Stat. 
3427 (JAN. 6, 2006): 1023.  
“National Drug Threat Assessment 2011.” Washington : U.S. Department of Justice : 
National Drug Intelligence Center, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf.  
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Understanding and Controlling the 
Demand for Illegal Drugs., Peter Reuter , National Research Council (U.S.). 
Committee on Law and Justice., and National Research Council (U.S.). Division 
of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. “Understanding the Demand 
for Illegal Drugs.”National Academies Press, 2010.  
 77
Nelid, Rachel. “U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies.” In Drugs and 
Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, edited by Youngers, 
Coletta and Eileen Rosin, 61–98. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005.  
Nordt, Carlos, and Rudolf Stohler. “Incidence of Heroin use in Zurich, Switzerland: A 
Treatment Case Register Analysis.” Lancet 367, no. 9525 (June 3, 2006): 1830–
1834. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140–
6736%2806%2968804–1/abstract;.  
Office of Drugs and Alcohol Research and Surveillance, Controlled Substances and 
Tobacco Directorate, Health Canada. Canadian Alcohol and Drug use Monitoring 
Survey. Ottawa, Canada, 2010.  
Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, Public Law 109–
469, 120 Stat. 3503 (DEC. 29, 2006).  
Olson, E. L., and C. E. Wilson. “Beyond Merida: The Evolving Approach to Security 
Cooperation.” Wilson Center, University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, 
Retrieved from Http://www.Wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Beyond 
percent20Merida.Pdf (2010).  
Powell, Martin, Steve Rolles, and George Murkin. The Alternative World Drug Report: 
Counting the Cost of the War on Drugs: Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 
2012.  
“Press Briefing by Dana Perino.” White House Office of the Press Secretary. press 
release, June 3, 2008, accessed 03/12, 2013, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/06/20080603–3.html.  
Reynolds, Maura, and Sam Enriquez. “Calderon Pressures Bush on Immigration.” Los 
Angeles Times,2007.  
Rydell, C. P., Susan S. Everingham, Arroyo Center., and United States. Army., RAND 
Drug Policy Research Center. and United States. Office of National Drug Control 
Policy. “Controlling Cocaine Supply Versus Demand Programs.” RAND.  
Scherlen, Renee. “The Never-Ending Drug War: Obstacles to Drug War Policy 
Termination.” PS: Political Science & Politics 45, no. 01 (2012): 67. 
doi:10.1017/S1049096511001739. 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1017/S1049096511001739.  
Seelke, Clare Rebaldo. Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and 
Policy Issues: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2009.  
———. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2010.  
 78
———. Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues: 
Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2010.  
———. Library of Congress and Congressional Research Service. “Mexico Issues for 
Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf.  
Seelke, Clare Rebaldo, Kristin M. Finkle, and Library of Congress. Congressional 
Research Service. U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation the Mérida Initiative and 
Beyond. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011.  
Seelke, Claire Rebaldo., L. S. Wyler, and June S. Beittel. “Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs.” DTIC 
Document, 2011.  
Seelke, Clare R., Liana S. Wyler, June S. Beittel, Library of Congress and Congressional 
Research Service. “Latin America and the Caribbean Illicit Drug Trafficking and 
U.S. Counterdrug Programs.” Congressional Research Service, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf.  
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law. Drug Enforcement and 
the Rule of Law: Mexico and Colombia. 2010.  
Shirk, David. A. “Justice Reform in Mexico: Change & Challenges in the Judicial 
Sector.” Shared Responsibility (2010): 205.  
———. Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat. New York, NY, USA: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2011.  
Smith, Chris. Assessing the Merida Initiative: Report from the GAO, edited by 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere Government Printing Office, 2010.  
Trace, Mike. Drug Policy – Lessons Learnt, and Options for the Future: Global 
Commission on Drugs, 2011.  
Turner, Jim. Transforming the Southern Border: Providing Security & Prosperity in the 
Post-9/11 World: United States Congress House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, 2004.  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2011. New York: United 
Nations Pub, 2011.  
———. World Drug Report 2012. New York: United Nations, 2012.  
 
 79
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Oficina en 
Colombia, United Nations, and Commission on Human Rights. Report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights 
Situation in Colombia. Geneva: United Nations, 2004. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,COI,UNCHR,COUNTRYREP,COL,409
100060,0.html.  
———. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Human Rights Situation in Colombia. Geneva: United Nations, 2000.  
United States Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership. “The Hybrid Threat 
Crime, Terrorism and Insurgency in Mexico.” Washington, D.C., Washington, 
D.C.: Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2011.  
United States Congress House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
Quitting Hard Habits: Efforts to Expand and Improve Alternatives to 
Incarceration for Drug-Involved Offenders. 111th Cong., 2nd sess., 2011.  
United States Congress House of Representatives. Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 
Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations. 111. 1 sess. (March 11, 
2009): H.R. 1105.  
United States Congress House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 
and House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and 
Management. Is Merida Antiquated? Part Two: Updating U.S. Policy to Counter 
Threats of Insurgency and Narco-Terrorism. 2011.  
United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Assessing the Merida 
Initiative: A Report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Serial no. 
111–109, July 21, 2010, 111–2 Hearing, *. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Publishing Office, 2010.  
United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Merida Initiative to 
Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008. 
110. 2 sess. House Report 110–673(May 22, 2008): 110–673.  
United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere. Guns, Drugs and Violence: The Merida Initiative and the 
Challenge in Mexico: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, March 18, 2009. Washington: U.S. 




United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere (2007- ). Assessing the Mérida Initiative: A Report from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO): Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 21, 2010. 
Washington: U.S. G.P.O.: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2010.  
United States Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere (2007- ) and United States Congress House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Has Mérida 
Evolved?: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 
and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First 
Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 
2011.  
United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Merida Initiative: 
Guns, Drugs, and Friends: A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, 
December 21, 2007. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007. 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS89345.  
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies. “Results from the 
2007 National Survey on Drug use and Health: Detailed Tables.” Ann Arbor, 
Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research distributor, 
accessed 02/07, 2013, 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10ResultsTables/NSDUHTables2007R/
HTM/TOC.htm.  
———. “Results from the 2008 National Survey on Drug use and Health: Detailed 
Tables.” Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research distributor, accessed 02/07, 2013, 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10ResultsTables/NSDUHTables2008R/
HTM/TOC.htm.  
———. “Results from the 2009 National Survey on Drug use and Health: Detailed 
Tables.” Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 






———. “Results from the 2010 National Survey on Drug use and Health: Detailed 
Tables.” Ann Arbor, Mich. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research distributor, accessed 02/07, 2013, 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k10ResultsTables/NSDUHTables2010R/
HTM/TOC.htm.  
United States Department of State. “The Mérida Initiative U.S. – SICA Dialogue on 
Security December 11–12, 2008 Washington, DC.” United States Department of 
State, accessed 03/11, 2013, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB861.pdf.  
United States Dept. of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report. [Washington, D.C.]: The Bureau, 1991.  
United States Dept. of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Colombia, 2011.  
United States Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. “The Merida 
Initiative: Expanding the U.S./Mexico Partnership - Fact Sheet.,” accessed 
February 6, 2013, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2012/187119.htm.  
United States Department of State and United States Bureau for International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
for 2006.” International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1, (2006).  
———. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2012.” International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1, (2012).  
United States Government Accountability Office. Drug Policy and Agriculture U.S. 
Trade: Impacts of Alternative Crops to Andean Coca: Report to Congressional 
Requesters. Washington, D.C.; Gaithersburg, MD (P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg 
20877): The Office of the President, 1991.  
United States Government Accountability Office. Merida Initiative the United States has 
Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance 
Measures : Report to Congressional Requesters. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. 
Accountability Office, 2012. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo9923.  
United States Government Accountability Office. “Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and 
ICE Interagency Agreement has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination of Drug 
Investigations.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 




United States Government Accountability Office. Joseph R. Biden, Jess T. Ford and 
United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “Plan Colombia 
Drug Reduction Goals were Not Fully Met, but Security has Improved; U.S. 
Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance : Report to the 
Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office.  
United States Internal Revenue Service. “Yearly Average Currency Exchange.” United 
States Internal Revenue Service, accessed February 4, 2013, 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Yearly-Average-
Currency-Exchange-Rates.  
United States National Forensics Laboratory. National Forensic Laboratory Information 
System 2011 Annual Report: U.S. Dept. of Justice Enforcement Administration 
Office of Diversion Control, 2011.  
Veillette, Connie, and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs FY2007 Assistance. 
[Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007.  
Veillette, Connie, Carolina Navarrete-Frías, Library of Congress, and Congressional 
Research Service. Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the 
Andes. Variation: Major Studies and Issue Briefs of the Congressional Research 
Service. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
2005.  
Walser, Ray. Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight we Cannot Afford 
to Lose. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2008.  
War on Drugs Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: 
Global Commission on Drugs, 2011.  
White House Administrative Office (U.S.). “The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America.” United States Government Printing Office, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.  
Wilkinson, Tracy. “Drug Cartel Taints Attorney General’s Office.” Los Angeles Times 
(LATWP News Service) (CA),2008.  
Wilson, Laura, and Alex Stevens. Understanding Drug Markets and how to Influence 
them: Beckley Foundation, 2008.  
Wodak, Alek. Demand Reduction and Harm Reduction: Working Paper for the First 
Meeting of the Global Commission on Drug Policies. Geneva, Switzerland: 
Global Commission on Drug Policies, 2011.  
 83
Youngers, Coletta, and Eileen Rosin. Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The 
Impact of U.S. Policy. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005. 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0419/2004014978.html.  
———. “The U.S. “War on Drugs”: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In 
Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, 1–13. 









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 85
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
  
 
